Daily Report

East Europe

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Bulgaria: Commentary on Videnov's FRY Visit

AU1602130696 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 16 Feb 96 p 6

[Commentary by Plamen Kulinski]

[FBIS Translated Text] In contrast to President Zhelev, Prime Minister Videnov did not get to Zagreb and Sarajevo. However, again in contrast to Zhelev, he did not miss going to Belgrade. In this we see a further demonstration of the lack of unity between the institutions in implementing foreign policy, and not only in the Balkans.

However, the positive results from Videnov visiting the FRY might be quite substantial, not merely from the viewpoint of political expediency, provided, of course, that the stories that have circulated during these two days prove to have solid content. As regards the prospects for Bulgaria's participation in the postwar reconstruction of Bosnia, for example, the answer is more likely to be no than yes. Regardless of Sofia's appeals for this to form a kind of compensation for the losses suffered from observing the Yugo-embargo, the likelihood of this happening is almost nil; the competition in the dogfight for this bone is too unequal.

Appetites have also been whetted in relation to Serbia and Montenegro after the lifting of the sanctions. As far as Bulgaria is concerned, Belgrade might make a gesture, and not only because of the party sympathies with the present regime in Sofia. The FRY owes us a debt for our position and actions during the Yugo-crisis, which were not to Zagreb's liking, for example. However, this is not the only reason. During the two days spent in Belgrade and Podgorica, all of the members of Zhan Videnov's delegation stressed the fact that they were on a visit precisely to the FRY and not to Serbia or Montenegro.

At the moment when Belgrade is looking for political support on the issue of succession to the former Yugoslav Federation, the Bulgarian Government's attitude toward this issue, as evidenced by the Videnov visit itself and by its assistance in reintegrating the FRY into the international organizations and financial and trade institutions, should be accorded the merit it deserves. Moreover, Belgrade's assessment should find expression in a concrete repayment of its debt—for example, in the form of preferential agreements. In any case, Sofia should not be ashamed to say exactly how it might be repaid.

Bulgaria: BSP's Vatsev on Videnov's Attitude to Power

AU1502143396 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 9 Feb 96 p 10

[Interview with Valentin Vatsev, a member of the BSP Executive Bureau, by Sevda Dinovska; place and date not given: "Videnov Turned Off Faucet for 10 November Leadership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Dinovska] Mr. Vatsev, the orthodox Socialists are saying: "I did not vote exactly for this party."

[Vatsev] I claim that this cabinet is working for the interest of the vast majority of Bulgarian citizens. However, with each of its actions, the cabinet turns off another faucet, curbs another private interest, eliminates the appetite of certain people, complicates the life of the 10 November leadership, and restricts the living conditions of the cultural and economic elite, which grew a great deal after 10 November. With each of its actions, the cabinet brings us further away from the roundtable period, when political power used to be distributed through public negotiations. Naturally, this is intolerable, and those 10,000-20,000 people who form the self-proclaimed public elite—bankers, businessmen, politicians, media bosses, cultural figures—feel themselves restricted in their activity. They control the basic media resources and use them for a desperate struggle. I fully understand them.

[Dinovska] Do you want to say that there is no reason to criticize this cabinet?

[Vatsev] This cabinet can and must be criticized. However, first of all it must be clear why the cabinet is being criticized. Some are criticizing it because the cabinet is doing what it should not do, others because the cabinet is doing precisely what it should do.

The representatives of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] in the government must make efforts to be seen as "our people," who have been sent to state positions to put some order in the country, rather than as "the people up there."

[Dinovska] I have the feeling that this is not the case.

[Vatsev] This is a great battle. It is the task of the prime minister to maneuver himself in a position in which he is viewed as our society's representative in the state machine, rather than as the spokesman for the state employees, who are traditionally mistrusted by the Bulgarian people. As far as I can see, Videnov and some of his ministers are indeed seen as representatives of our society, who are trying to put some order in our state. However, if this position is to be maintained, the prime

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minister and his ministers must present specific evidence every hour.

There is another way in which the cabinet could put an end to the media war against it. It suffices if Videnov changes the cabinet's formula and agrees to the representation of more interests of circles, groups, and political and economic strata in the cabinet. There are people in the BSP who advocate such a governmental architecture. If this happens, "Oriongate" will disappear as if it had never existed, all other affairs will vanish, and there will be no better cabinet than the current one. To put it in even more simple words: If Videnov agrees to form a cabinet of the "Berov" type, he will become the best possible prime minister. Suddenly some 15,000-20,000 people, who now feel threatened, will fall in love with him. However, if this happens, Videnov will lose a few "negligent" things, such as the confidence of our society, and soon afterward he will fall.

[Dinovska] What shocks in the BSP could be expected?

[Vatsev] The BSP is a sufficiently stable political force and those conflicts, which are very subjective, senseless, and malicious, will be resolved through the existing usual procedure that already proved its efficiency—the dialogue.

[Dinovska] You know Videnov very well. Do you think he is recognized as a leader?

[Vatsev] I do not know Videnov very well, but now is the time to express certain suspicions I have regarding his attitude to power. I think he is one of those destined to always bite the cucumber from its bitter end. In other words, when you give him power he views it as responsibility. He has a very strong character, which many could interpret as a weakness—namely, his ability to absorb the possibly complete responsibility for the situation and not share it with anyone. This is wonderful for a politician but very threatening for the people around him because this is the road toward authoritarian leadership. For the time being, it is impossible to talk about authoritarian leadership, but I know that, theoretically, the existing situation leads precisely in this direction. When the boss assumes all of the responsibility, sooner or later his subordinates begin to view him as a father, and the power of every father is authoritarian by definition.

Bulgaria: BSP Official Urges Videnov To Change Style

AU1502154096 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 9 Feb 96 p 3

[Interview with Valentin Vatsev, member of the Executive Bureau of the Bulgarian Socialist Party and chief political affairs expert, by Svetlana Belousova; place and date not given: "'Oriongate' Scandal Is a Slap on the Saddle Pack To Make the Donkey Wake Up"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Belousova] Mr. Vatsev, what are the findings in your analysis of Orion?

[Vatsev] This affair forms part of the internal party mechanism for making problems out of reality. A problem does exist, and a solution is being sought. It is a question of party dialogue and party communications. This notorious report about Orion does not claim to be something special. It is simply an assessment of the situation by political experts, who propose several hypotheses, none of which can be said to be 100-percent proved.

[Belousova] What are your forecasts and principal findings in the report?

[Vatsev] First, I believe that the whole affair is very similar to a propaganda robot. We should not be looking for a universal conspiracy of circles seeking to cause splits. The main reasons for this pressure against the government can be found in the actions of the government itself. I noted in my analysis that all of the cabinet's activities should be a subject of continuous debate. I reach the conclusion that no one in Bulgaria wants early parliamentary elections, nor is the overthrow of the Videnov administration the main goal. The end goal may be achieved if the cabinet is compelled to make certain changes in its membership. The pressure will be stepped up to force a change in the cabinet formula—that is, to make it change the way in which various political groups within the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and outside are represented in the government.

[Belousova] You talk about a cabinet formula, but aren't the charges leveled against specific people in Videnov's entourage?

[Vatsev] I think the high tension will continue, even if Videnov immediately dismisses all of the accused, unless at the same time he gives up certain administrative actions that violate important interests. In effect, this is a slap on the saddle pack to make the donkey wake up. However, the saddle pack does not sit very well.

[Belousova] How can the government immunize itself against further "gate" scandals?

[Vatsev] The party leader should have more frequent contact with his party. He is absorbed in affairs of state. The party loves him but, from time to time, does not understand him. Accordingly, he should constantly explain what he is doing. It is absolutely essential to correct our media policy as soon as possible, in

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particular the work of the two press centers—the Council of Ministers and the BSP Supreme Council. One must overcome this youthful chutzpah that a job well done speaks for itself. One must tactfully but firmly remove the employees and officials charged with maintaining links to suspect organizations. I do not want to make any recommendation to Raydovski [chief of the Council of Ministers Press Center], but I think that any accused person should bang the table and demand immediate proof of the charges against him.

[Belousova] Will the next scandal be connected with Neftokhim?

[Vatsev] Yes, that is very likely. I am sure that the next "gate" scandal will be somewhere in the key sectors on which the population relies—the energy industry, the fuel industry, or the anima-feed industry. It will be a sector that affects many people and one that is stuck in the mire. It may be the banks. However, this is a problem for other people, and I cannot know.

Bulgaria: Meeting of Parties Backing Georgiev for Mayor

AU1502133696 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 15 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In Kurdzhali today, the leaders of 30 political forces and public organizations supporting the independent mayoral candidate Dr. Georgi Georgiev decided to nominate their candidates for municipal councillors in two lists: The first list will include candidates of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and its coalition partners, and the second the candidates nominated by the Bulgarian Business Bloc [BBB] and its allied organizations. At their third meeting, scheduled for 21 February, the parties will announce their proposed candidates.

According to our correspondent Georgi Talev, Antoaneta (?Panusheva), whom Khaskovo Oblast Adminstrator Angel Naydenov yesterday appointed acting mayor of Kurdzhali Municipality, has declared that she accepts the oblast administration's decision but will assume her duties when she receives notification of the order in writing, which is expected to arrive this afternoon.

Bulgaria: Link Between Deputies, Arrested Officers

AU1502110796 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 13 Feb 96 p 1

[Article by Stoyan Petrov: "National Assembly Deputies Allegedly Had Direct Contact With Arrested Officers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A senior officer from the Armed Forces Prosecutor's Office stated that the stories alleging that the four officers engaged in research work who were arrested are spies are pure fabrication. The source, who wished to remain anonymous, added that, if it is necessary to give a name to the crime committed by the officers, it might be described as poaching. According to the source, the case relates to an adminstrative offense, and this is the aspect from which the investigation will be conducted against Colonel Emiliyan Suslekov, senior scientific associate first grade,a nd Majors Vladimir Turtanski, Rumen Simeonov, and Valeri Nedyalkin. The four officers work at the Military Scientific and Technical Institute (VNTI). As is known, they were arrested on suspicion on 6 February and charged with committing an offense in violation of their their duties under Article 387 of the Penal Code.

According to initial information, the military prosecutors do not exclude the possibility that National Assembly deputies participated in the four companies through which the arrested officers carried on illegal trade in secret research developments. Lawyers consider that the link is very flimsy and, accordingly, difficult to prove. To date, the investigators have discovered four parliamentary deputies, but their names cannot be disclosed at present because of the confidentiality of the investigation.

Regardless of the link discovered to parliament deputies, the investigation will be conducted only with regard to the original charge of violation of duty.

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Czech Republic: Klaus Discusses Davos Forum, Republic

AU1602102496 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 10 Feb 96 p 8

[Article by Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus: "The Czech Republic Through the Eyes of Davos"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Whenever I say something positive about our country or our economy at home, it is always considered by my a priori critics as inappropriate self-praise. Therefore I would have liked all of our unpleasant critics to be able to participate in the Davos [World Economic Forum] discussions and draw their own conclusions about the international assessment of our country.

Thanks to the CTK correspondent, it almost seems here that the main event in Davos this year was my brief exchange of opinions on economic policy with the EU commissioner, Dutchman Van den Broek. Within the framework of a 90-minute discussion, one of dozens of similar topics, it was a topic for several minutes and therefore truly marginal but, since it has become a topic of discussions here, I must insist that the participants at the Davos forum were visibly, and with a preponderant majority, on my side, and that it was not a crude attack on my part. It was more of a smirk. After all, it is obvious to everyone that it is not possible to go on in the EU for long without a fundamental change in the system and size of agricultural subsidies, and that it certainly would be impossible to admit any other country to the EU like this.

Today, the Czech Republic is unequivocally classified in the group of the "fastest growing markets in Europe" (which was the title of one evening discussion), and everyone who has followed the development in West Europe in the 1990's and everyone who read the report from the Czech Statistical Office last week, which states that the overall demand in our economy rose by 7.3 percent last year (in comparison with 4.2 percent in 1994 and 2.3 percent in 1993), must confirm that it is true. That the demand for imports rose faster than that for domestic production and that imports rose (by 28.6 percent) faster than exports (by 10.3 percent) are well-known facts (and discussed by many experts in Davos). I have repeatedly explained there as well as at home that world exports rose 7.8 percent last year, while Czech exports rose 10.3 percent, which is not a bad result; that in 1994 our exports increased by 6.6 percent, in the first half of 1995 by 8.1 percent, and in the second half of 1995 by 12.5 percent, which is also a favorable trend; that our imports in the first half of last year rose 32.8 percent, while in the second half "only" by 25.1 percent; that the balance of services (and tourism in particular) had a large surplus again in 1995, so exactly one-half of the trade deficit (an amount of 101 billion korunas [Kc]) was covered by the services; that the surplus on the capital account of the balance of payments grew (about Kc250 billion last year); and that the inflow of short-term capital is slowing down, while the share of long-term capital is growing.

There was a fruitful discussion in Davos about the lesson learned from the Mexican financial crisis, and, because of our experience, I was asked to moderate this discussion in a closed panel (and here I would like to note that fellow minister Dlouhy appeared at almost the same time on a very similar panel at another place in the Davos maze). The topic is for us undoubtedly topical. What mistakes did Mexico make? What was a completely external influence that Mexico could not affect? Did the world community help adequately and fast enough? What role did the fixed exchange rate play in all this? What about the election promises of the Mexican ruling party? What was the impact of short-term capital that can overnight disappear from the country? What role did the exaggerated reactions of financial circles play?

The Czech Republic certainly is completely immune to neither its own mistakes nor the fluctuation of the world financial markets, but the Mexican crisis doubtlessly was (and is) a lesson to us, and, as I could see, it has been a lesson for the whole of Latin America, Asia, and also Central and East Europe. At the same time, everyone is aware of the fact that, thanks to the initiative of the United States, no other country will be helped as Mexico was helped (just a few months after joining NAFTA [North American Free Trade Association).

The crisis of paternalism—that is, the welfare state—was also discussed in Davos and its long-term unsustainable cost, as well as the ticking time bomb of an aging population in most countries of the world (and the myopic readiness of the old-age pension systems for this novel demographic development). The dramatically rising cost of health care was discussed with the exaggerated dependence on the solidarity health-insurance system (I emphasize that this is not only in the Czech Republic) and the exaggerated weight in general of the state in the redistribution processes of all kinds. Most participants in the discussion emphasized the political and social difficulty of a significant reduction of the state budget share in the GDP, but, despite the election gestures made by the Civic Democratic Alliance at home right now, we can be satisfied in this respect. Our state share in the economy is not very high in the international context, and, what is more, it keeps declining.

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The unified European currency was also discussed. We know only too well from our own experience that a unified Czechoslovak currency (or the Czechoslovak currency union) required a substantial Czecho-Slovak redistribution. The Germans know very well that the currency union between West and East Germany required (and five years after its implementation, still requires) a tremendous budget redistribution from the West of the country to the East. It is somewhat disheartening that no one in Europe reflects on the extent of budget redistribution that would result if the European currency union were implemented. It seems to me a bit unfair to the citizens, the taxpayers, in all European countries.

Davos, in my case, remains an inspiration even for the seventh time. It is a meeting of people, many of whom have something to say. We must be able to listen, and we must also dare to say something—if we have something to say. And I believe we do.

Czech Republic: Commentary on ODS, KDU-CSL Links

AU1502120896 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 10 Feb 96 p 12

[Commentary by Jiri Leschtina: "Lux and Klaus: The Mournful Necessity of Coexistence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Arduous and mournful is the coalition coexistence of the two strongest government partners—Klaus's ODS [Civic Democratic Party] and Lux's People's Party [KDU-CSL]. It is even more arduous and mournful because precisely these parties, which do not cleave together by their political and human empathies, apparently will be condemned to government cooperation also in the future.

The most recent announcement by Josef Lux that the People's Party will support the extremely irresponsible proposal by the CSSD [Czech Social Democratic Party] to again lower the pension age is only one of many pokes in the ODS's ribs. Lux's summer flirtation with Milos Zeman, at the time when support for the CSSD was steeply rising, or the most recent rollicking of the KDU-CSL chairman with another distinguished personality from the opposition, Jiri Dienstbier—all this is reason for many ODS members to refer to their government partner only as the perfidious People's Party.

Some of Lux's political shuffle truly does not make the best esthetic impression. The conduct of the ODS in relation to the KDU-CSL, however, cannot be considered a model of partnership propriety, either. Recent implications by ODS Deputy Chairman Libor Novak and Deputy Jan Kramek that the KDU-CSL benefits from military contracts were an indecent blow below the belt. Similarly, it will be difficult for Lux to forgive Vaclav Klaus for promising at the time of the unexpected growth of popularity of the CSSD that the boulder of church restitutions would soon be rolled aside, and happily putting the problem of church property back on ice as soon as the danger of Zeman's firm start passed.

Nevertheless, whatever has happened or is still to happen between the KDU-CSL and the ODS in the coming months, one thing is certain: Unless there is a complete turnabout in the voters' support, it will be precisely the ODS that, once the dust of the election pandemonium settles, will again find by its side cultivated Josef Lux, without whose stable Christian votes Vaclav Klaus will never find enough support to form a majority government.

From this vantage point, Josef Lux can really only laugh at the portentous grumble of Jiri Honajzer, chairman of the ODS Deputies' Club, appealing to the People's Party to leave the coalition if they together with the opposition bury the higher pension age that was so difficult to impose.

If an appeal can be made on Josef Lux, then only by pointing out that he gains nothing by the campaign against the pension bill law and harms a good thing in the process. Surveys speak clearly: Lux's "social market" rhetoric boosts his personal popularity but in no way changes the support for the People's Party. Lux's populism so far simply does not fascinate any substantial part of the atheist voters to the point where they would actually consider supporting a Christian party.

On the other hand, the loyalty of the Christian supporters of the KDU-CSL is almost unshakable. This strength cannot be shaken even by Pilip's Christian democrats holding attractive spots on the ODS slate. Hence, the call by Christian Democratic Party Deputy Michal Lobkowicz that it would be good for the Republic if the next right-wing government coalition could do without the People's Party comes out only as a hopeful wish.

The present political reality is such that the People's Party is certain of a place in any coalition. The already tested presence of the KDU-CSL in the right-wing government is, however, despite all of the difficulties, much less of an adventure than its conceivable coalition with unpredictable Zeman, which apparently could exist with just silent support from the communists.

Precisely when they face such nightmares, both Klaus's and Lux's parties should remind themselves over and over again of the only thing that brings them together, which is a responsibility for the continuation of what is so far a promising development.

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Slovakia: MOS Criticizes Secret Service, Meciar

LD1502195796 Bratislava Slovak Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 15 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian Civic Party [MOS] has information that the Slovak secret service has been organizing separate departments within the institution, tasked with the surveillance of Hungarian politicians and other groups uncomfortable to the government coalition. This has been announced by MOS Deputy Chairman Laszlo Gyurovszky. The secret service led by Ivan Lexa is more and more similar to the communist system's secret service—that is, the StB.

According to Gyurovszky, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's foreign trips are increasingly in contrast with the government program because they have focused on the East and not on the West. In his interview given to the Russian paper V.I.P., Meciar speaks about the country's neutrality and not about integration into Western structures, MOS's deputy chairman said.

Slovakia: SDL's Weiss on Possible Entry Into Coalition

AU1602094096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 13 Feb 96 pp 1-2

[Interview with Slovak SDL Chairman Peter Weiss by Jana Pankovcinova in Bratislava; date not given: "The SDL Wants To Be Ready for Any Alternative Development in the Slovak Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to [Deputy Chairwoman] Brigita Schmognerova, the conditions for possible entry into the government are being drawn up within the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL].

[Pankovcinova] Could you specify them?

[Weiss] First, the SDL has not received any offer to enter into the government. Second, the domestic political situation, both in connection with privatization and with regard to the major political decisions on integration into NATO and the EU, will move forward—maybe even turbulently. Third, the SDL should be ready for any alternative. Fourth, we have already had experience in government; we know what we were good at and what we underestimated. From an objective point of view, we would like to draft policy requirements and also political priorities for our involvement in any kind of government—that is, the circumstances under which it would eventually be possible to consider a governing coalition with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. We will discuss this in the party.

[Pankovcinova] What are, at least, the basic tenets of the SDL's conditions for involvement in the government?

[Weiss] There are two kinds of conditions—general political ones and conditions concerning specific spheres: economic, social, privatization, and so on. We will again demand that the tendencies toward an authoritarian method of government are discontinued, that the Slovak Republic's abiding tradition is an antifascist tradition, and that the attempts to rehabilitate Dr. Tiso cease. The issues of the pluralist supervision of the public-service media and the Slovak Information Service, respect for the relationships among the government, the president, and the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR] granted by the Constitution, the pluralist composition of NR SR bodies, and so on are important to us. These are general democratic conditions, but we also have others as a left-wing party. It was not by coincidence that we described the draft law on income tax as an expression of extreme right-wing policy merely serving the interests of a small group of people who conducted privatization only on the basis of a sale to an interested party selected in advance. The SDL is interested in ensuring that at least the rest of privatization is carried out transparently.

[Pankovcinova] For the moment, the ruling coalition in the NR SR appears to be firm. Do you consider a change in the ratio of forces to be realistic?

[Weiss] A conflict between two interests lies at the heart of our political life. On the one hand, there is the Slovak Republic's long-term national state interest, which is preordained by the need to round off Slovakia's democratic form and to create the conditions for equal and as-fast-as-possible integration into the European structures. On the other hand, there is the interest, first and foremost, of a single group of privatizers. At the same time, privatization is taking place spontaneously—not on the basis of regulations supervised by the public but on the basis of behind-the-scenes political decisions. These two interests are confronting one another, which is also being manifested in the plan to privatize quickly the largest banking institutions by a group of Slovak enterprises that are also the creditors of these banks. This is leading to a massive concentration of economic and political power. It is in the hands of the HZDS; it has the responsibility. The examples from Latin America—Chile and other countries—suggest that it is possible to achieve relatively good macroeconomic indicators in a short period, but these authoritarian regimes, founded on a concentration of industrial and financial capital, get into a crisis sooner or later.

[Pankovcinova] Your colleague, R. Fico, has emphasized that the SDL congress has to deal with the kind of policy you will formulate—opposition or coalition. To which one are you inclined?

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[Weiss] After the elections, I proposed a grand coalition that would have created the prerequisites for conciliation. The HZDS rejected this. The SDL went into the opposition following the parliamentary night in November 1994; our republic council rejected categorically the method of government by the HZDS-Farmers' Party of Slovakia, Slovak National Party, and Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] coalition—and its conclusion is still binding for me. I am not dogmatic, and I know that a different policy would be necessary for the Slovak Republic, with regard to both its contents and the dispensing power and respect for democratic principles. If I could see that there are conditions for the SDL, by reconstructing the current government, to be able to promote such a policy, why should I be opposed to entering into the government? But, at the moment, unfortunately, I do not see that the HZDS or the ZRS would be interested in modifying its policy.

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Hungary: Value of U.S. Troops' 'Continued Deployment'

AU1502144196 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 15 Feb 96 pp 1, 3

[Correspondent's report: "Will the Americans Stay Also After the Yugoslav Mission?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] John P. White, general deputy U.S. secretary of defense, said on 14 February that he did not exclude the possibility that U.S. troops will stay at the Air Force base in Taszar under NATO auspicies even after the end of their Yugoslav mission. He added that it is too early to deal with the issue, because creating peace is the most important thing now. Military experts differ in their interpretation of this statement. However, they exclude the possibility of a continued NATO basis in Hungary.

So far, the U.S. troops have taken full control of the Taszar airfield and the Fured 2 barracks in Kaposvar. Hungarian and U.S. troops are jointly operating the command building of the Air Force base and its ancillary buildings. Some Hungarian pilots deployed in Kecskemet and Papa are carrying out training and exercise flights and the others are attending language courses. As far as the Hungarian pilots know, Taszar will cease to exist for them. The Defense Ministry neither rejected nor confirmed this.

Lieutenant General Bela Biro, deputy commander of the Hungarian army, told NEPSZAVA that a preliminary agreement has been reached on allowing U.S. troops to use the military bases and ranges in Tatarszentgyorgy and Taborfalva for training beginning 1 April. Groups of 300 soldiers will carry out shooting exercises with hand arms, tanks, and artillery pieces for five days every month or every six weeks. Bela Biro said that the civilian population does not have to fear the movement of equipment in the area, because only soldiers are transported there, the equipment is not.

We learned that the IFOR [Implementation Force] will pay for the use of the bases and the necessary investments. Investment projects worth 250 million forints [Ft] are being carried out by Hungarian entrepreneurs, and there is a possibility for the employment of 200 civilians as well.

Bela Biro was unable to give us more information about further concrete factors. We learned from other sources that the U.S. troops' use of the shooting range in Hajmasker in the Veszprem district was also discussed: They want to carry out shooting exercises involving helicopters here. There is no contract yet, but negotiations are underway. We also learned from military sources that the Americans have also raised the idea of using the former Soviet barracks and ammunition depot in Dombovar. They would also like to rent civilian storage facilities in the Kiskorpad region in order to use them as transit bases. They are also considering the use of an office building in Kaposvar. An agreement has already been reached on the use of the Kaposujlak airport.

Robert Hunter, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, met with the mayors of Kaposvar, Taszar, Kaposujlak, and Pecs in Brussels on 14 February and thanked the delegation of local government officials for the assistance Hungary and this region has provided for the success of the peace mission in Bosnia.

According to an eminent military expert interviewed by NEPSZAVA, Hungarian politics is striving to have the U.S. troops stay in Hungary after settling the Yugoslav crisis. "There are political circles here who think that the deployment of U.S. troops in Hungary is good for us, because who would dare attack a country in which a stray bullet might strike a U.S. soldier"—the military expert said.

At the same time, he pointed out that Hungary does not have a potential enemy and, therefore, it is useless to strive for the continued deployment of U.S. troops here, because this also involves a lot of danger: We do not know how Moscow would react to the existence of a NATO deployment in its immediate vicinity. In addition, maintaining this base after the end of the IFOR mandate would put an end to the agreement between Washington and Moscow on settling the Yugoslav crisis, and this could lead to serious consequences. Such declarations and political efforts to keep the U.S. troops here could only harm the Hungarian security policy—the expert thinks.

At the same time, it seems plausible that the United States would benefit from keeping its troops here: On the one hand, one can easily keep an eye on the Yugoslav region from western Hungary, and the Yugoslav region might continue to be a potential powder keg for years. On the other hand, Moscow did not oppose the establishment of the base, and it is easier to accept the future operation of an existing infrastructure than the possible construction of a new one, if necessary.

According to Peter Deak, head of the Security Policy and Defense Research Institute, what lies behind the statement of the U.S. deputy secretary of defense is that the Americans would gladly maintain a logistical center here, a center that could be the training place of countries participating in the peace partnership. This cannot be called a U.S. military base at all, because the center would only fulfill training and coordination tasks

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on the basis of the existing infrastructure and, therefore, this solution would save expenses for NATO. At the same time, Peter Deak did not exclude the possibility that all this is also a "Moscow-test" or assessing the reaction of the Russian politics to such a step.

Hungary: Slovak Secret Service 'Shadowing' Parties

LD1502175996 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1400 GMT 15 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputy chairman of the Hungarian Civic Party [MOS], Laszlo Gyurovszky, said at a press conference in Bratislava today [15 February] that he was concerned by the fact that the Slovak Intelligence Service [SIS] and the ruling power behind it were trying to disrupt the dual political system in Slovakia.

According to Gyurovszky, MOS has information that the SIS is creating departments charged with shadowing [ethnic] Hungarian political parties and troublesome civic groups.

Hungary: MDF's Fur Not To Run in Leadership Election

LD1502183396 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1300 GMT 15 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Lajos Fur [chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF] has personally confirmed that he is not planning to run in the party leadership election to keep his post, but maintains his right to review and change his decision if an extraordinary situation evolves within the party.

The MDF chairman laid special emphasis on the fact that he did not resign in favor of Sandor Lezsak or Ivan Szabo.

Hungary: Moderate Right-Wing Association To Form

AU1402125396 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 13 Feb 96 p 5

[Report by "A.Zs.-Cs.I.": "Civilian Civic Alliance—Hungarian Civic Cooperation Association Is Being Formed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As a top organization of the civic alliances, circles, and associations set up by the moderate right wing, the Hungarian Civic Cooperation Association [Magyar Polgari Egyuttmukodes Egyesulet] will be formed on 25 February. According to our information, Ferenc Madl is proposed as chairman of the association, and the founders would welcome Janos Latorcai from the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] and Laszlo Kover and Agnes Hankiss from the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party [FIDESZ-MPP] in the executive committee.

The association will be set up under the notion of cooperation by the moderate right-wing parties, namely, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the KDNP, and the FIDESZ. MDF Executive Chairman Ivan Szabo said that the decision to set up the association was made on the so-called civic boat in August 1995. The organization, which is to include 140 to 150 civilian civic circles, would be based on the MDF, the KDNP, and the FIDESZ, basically as an appendage of the three-party "civic alliance" in the civilian sphere, Szabo said. According to Szabo, one cannot talk about a true party alliance in the case of the Hungarian Civic Cooperation Association, at the same time, "it would be good for the party politicians to understand the message of the membership's will coming from below."

According to KDNP Executive Chairman Tibor Fuzessy, none of the KDNP's leading bodies know about the new association. Fuzessy said that he was surprised at the news and cannot yet see what the goals of the new organization will be. Fuzessy recalled the decision of the KDNP's national committee, which states that the KDNP will not join any party alliances, including the civic alliance, for the time being. He also called attention to an earlier letter of the executive committee which prohibited the local organizations and the membership from joining similar alliances. Talking about the association, Fuzessy noted: He hopes that if a Christian Democrat politician wishes to join the association that is to be formed at the end of February he will first consult the party's executive committee.

FIDESZ parliamentary deputy Zoltan Trombitas told MAGYAR HIRLAP: The Hungarian Civic Cooperation Association is being formed at the initiative of the intellectuals associated with the three opposition parties. The participants believe that the moderate right-wing parties have to provide an alternative to the current coalition.

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B-H: NATO Reports Capture of 'Terrorist Training Camp'

AU1602115696 Paris AFP in English 1110 GMT 16 Feb 96

FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 16 (AFP) — NATO forces captured a terrorist training camp in central Bosnia taking eight Bosnians and three men presumed to be Iranian into custody, NATO said Friday.

The 11 men, whose arrest was announced late Thursday, were caught in a camp based in a former ski chalet about ten kilometres (six miles) south of Fojnica, in central Bosnia, officials said.

NATO had previously sited the camp just west of the capital Sarajevo.

The camp contained classrooms and an extensive armoury including explosives, hand-guns, sniper rifles, rocket and grenade launchers and assault rifles. It was captured at 2:00 p.m. (1300 GMT) Thursday without a shot being fired.

Admiral Leighton Smith, commander of the NATO peace implementation force in Bosnia, called the discovery of the camp "very, very disappointing."

He said he was outraged by the discovery of explosive devices and instructional materials whose clear targets seemed to be civilian and in some cases children.

NATO said the three men thought to be Iranians had not yet been positively identified but that a quantity of documentary material including documents in Farsi and open Iran Air tickets supported that presumption.

Foreign-born military forces are banned from Bosnia under the terms of the Dayton peace accord.

The United States, which contributed about one-third of the 60,000-strong NATO force in Bosnia has been particularly worried about the presence of Islamic fighters from countries having poor relations with the United States.

B-H: Foreign Minister on Iran's Role in Post-War Era

LD1402195696 Tehran IRNA in English 1812 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb. 14, IRNA — Bosnian Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic on Wednesday [14 February] described Iran's role in Bosnia in the post-war era as "of high significance" and underlined the need for all-out expansion of Tehran-Sarajevo cooperation.

Prlic, who was speaking to the Iranian Ambassador to Sarajevo Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian, thanked Iran for its unsparing efforts in providing humanitarian assistance to the Bosnian people, and called for the Islamic Republic's active presence in the cultural, economic and political fields in Bosnia's reconstruction era.

Taherian presented to Prlic a congratulatory message from Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati on his appointment to the post, and announced Iran's readiness for expansion of relations and deepening of economic cooperation with Bosnia in the reconstruction era.

He also extended an invitation to Prlic to visit Tehran.

B-H: Dutch Minister on International Post-IFOR Role

BR1602081796 Rotterdam ALGEMEEN DAGBLAD in Dutch 15 Feb 96 p 3

[Article by Ton Olde Monnikhof: "Voorhoeve Wants To Continue To Support Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Even after the NATO peacekeeping force leaves the former Yugoslavia, the international community must continue to ensure compliance with the Dayton agreement. Netherlands Defense Minister Voorhoeve made this statement yesterday in Bosnia, where he was visiting Dutch troops serving with IFOR [Implementation Force].

"In 1997, when IFOR's mandate expires, we must ensure a situation in which none of the three warring parties can violate the agreement," the minister said in Busovaca, where the Netherlands transport battalion is based.

The minister explicitly denied that he wanted to extend IFOR's 12-month mandate.

"It is clear that the Americans will be withdrawing their troops from October, with the American elections on 5 November, and that the British and Germans have made their presence in the former Yugoslavia dependent upon the U.S. presence. And as the Netherlands troops are under British command, there is little scope to decide otherwise." [passage omitted]

Three Air Force helicopters will be supporting the Netherlands troops in Bosnia. Voorhoeve's proposal is likely to be approved at tomorrow's cabinet meeting. The helicopters are needed because the sector is so large that transport by road takes too long. Voorhoeve: "We need additional people and additonal money, but that does not mean any dramatic change in the Netherlands' total military contribution to IFOR, estimated at 220 million guilders."

The three Alouette helicopters from the Gilze-Rijen base are now ready to travel to Bosnia. They will be primarily

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used to assist the Dutch troops in reconnaissance work in inhospitable areas and for light transportation. The helicopters will be accompanied by 20 soldiers. [passage omitted]

B-H: IFOR: Mladic Maintains 'Firm Grip' on Serb Army

AU1402165796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] Today's comment by IFOR [Implementation Force] spokesman Kirkwood clarifies that Mladic, despite the war crimes indictment against him, is still completely in charge. According to NATO, the criminal Mladic has maintained a firm grip on high-ranking military officials in the Serb entity's army, as is proven by the withdrawal of Serb liaison officers from the locations determined by NATO. [passage omitted]

B-H: Mladic Orders Guards To 'Kill Him' If Arrested

AU1602094296 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 15 Feb 96 p 5

["M.K." report: "Only Dead in The Hague"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The extradition of the two senior officers of the Army of the RS [Serb Republic] to The Hague is considered by the political circle in Pale as unprecedented. It is assumed that General Djukic and Lieutenant Krsmanovic will be used as prosecution witnesses in the trial of Gen. Ratko Mladic and President Radovan Karadzic. As claimed, IFOR [Implementation Force] has been authorized to arrest the two Serb leaders if it comes across them during routine checks.

The hunt for the two appears to have begun, and President Karadzic's office has unofficially confirmed that there are indications that his arrest has been planned.

Gen. Mladic, commander of the General Staff of the RS Army, has issued an order to his guards that, if he is arrested and unable to kill himself, they must kill him.

B-H: Serb Defense Minister: Arrests Threaten Peace

LD1502181496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1641 GMT 15 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, 15 Feb (TANJUG) — Milan Ninkovic, national defense Minister of the Serb Republic, said today in Pale that the arrest of the Serb officers by the Muslims and the prevention of freedom of movement of citizens in zones under the control of Implementation Force [IFOR] represent a serious threat to peace.

Ninkovic was having talks on the Dayton agreement and problems of its implementation with representatives of the EU observer mission for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Serb Republic defense minister called on the EU to demand the release of General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, officers of the Army of the Serb Republic, and an end to the economic blockade of the Serb Republic.

Ninkovic asked the representatives of the observer mission to call on the Muslim-Croat side to fully meet their obligations with regard to the release of remaining prisoners so that implementation of the peace agreement can continue.

B-H: Commentary Denies Arrests Threaten Peace Accord

AU1502202796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 15 Feb 96

[Commentary by Enes Osmancevic]

[FBIS Translated Text] The preposterous and implausible argument of certain diplomats recently put forward by members of the international political establishment, namely, that the arrest of persons suspected of war crimes is slowing down the implementation of the Dayton agreement, is dangerous for various reasons, primarily for the Dayton agreement itself. However, the barb inherent in this perfidious insinuation is aimed at the Bosniaks. Let us examine this point by point.

Only the true disciples of Karadzic's genocidal activities could have come up with the argument that the arrest of the aggressor officers Djukic and Krsmanovic, on suspicion of war crimes, is an obstacle to the implementation of the peace agreement. In fact, quite the opposite is true. The identification, arrest, and prosecution of all war criminals can contribute to the successful implementation of peace. This is one of the important prerequisites for the [words indistinct]. It seems that this argument was launched by those who fear that a part of their responsibility for the genocide of the Bosniaks will be disclosed before the tribunal in The Hague. No wonder, then, that they are fervent supporters of the adage: Peace, peace, no one is to blame.

They are increasingly easy to identify, as they were the ones who first denied the Bosniaks their right to self-defense, then promised to protect us, and are now preventing us from learning our lesson from everything that happened to us, from the horrific genocide committed against us. A perfidious insinuation, but one easily recognized in history, whose only objective is to destroy

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the Bosniaks' future. If we do not have the right to try criminals, then we have no rights whatsoever. Fortunately, such morbid strategists are becoming fewer.

The Djukic-Krsmanovic case has shown that no one who has committed war crimes in the so-called Serb Republic can be sure that they will fall asleep and wake up in the same place. Where they will wake up is The Hague. The fact that no one important devoted any particular attention to this perfidious twisting of the truth, and that Judge Goldstone and his associates nevertheless managed to succeed in the end, gives reason for optimism. After this, Kasagic's trotting from Dayton to Pale, as well as the behavior of many Western diplomats who are offering the Dayton agreement to the Bosniaks in the manner of Greeks bearing gifts, will be much clearer.

B-H: Political Gamble Behind Arrest of Serb Officers

BR1502155696 Paris LIBERATION in French 15 Feb 96 p 8

[Article by Jean Hatzfeld: "Enigma Surrounding Arrest of Serb Officers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] What is at stake politically with the arrest of the Serb officers in the Bosnian capital? The question became far more relevant after two fresh events yesterday. The first one was the announcement in the morning of the detention and possible transfer to The Hague of four officers who would normally have been released. Let us review the facts: Last Saturday [10 February] six officers were arrested by the Bosnian police, joining four others who were already in prison. On Monday two of them, General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, were transferred to The Hague and locked up at the request of the International War Crimes Tribunal [IWCT], while four were released, and four others were supposed to be released soon. So it was a surprise on Wednesday morning when the Bosnian Foreign Ministry called it off. It also caused diplomatic upheaval at the White House, where Warren Christopher called Alija Izetbegovic, the NATO general staff, and foreign ministries to convince the Bosnians to release these prisoners. There has also been vigorous intervention by U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrooke, who got the prisoners released in the end.

So why are the Bosnians hesitant about letting these officers go? When should the "big fish" be punished (one of them is said to be a well-known henchman of Belgrade warlord Arkan)? Are the Bosnian authorities tempted to exchange them for the Bosnian photographer who is being held and charged with war crimes? Do they want to make all the players aware, in spectacular fashion, of the problems involved in the criminal responsibility of the men who waged this war?

The second event of the day was the increasingly plausible and probable version which has it that the two Serb officers sent to The Hague were not arrested by chance after taking a wrong turn in the neighborhood of Stup — but that they were deliberately directed toward that police roadblock in order to give themselves up. Judging by the description of the arrest, this version is more convincing than the version that says it was a blunder. It could well give rise to some interesting questions, given that not only was General Djukic the logistics expert for General Mladic, but more importantly he was also one of the men loyal to Serbian President Milosevic and one of the former Yugoslav Army stalwarts within the general staff of his Bosnian Serb troops. Could he have defected to try to save his skin in exchange for his good will before the IWCT?

Could he have information likely to compromise the Serbian president, forcing him to intervene in one way or another?

These adventures, which highlight the problem of justice and war crimes, are bogging down the workings of the Dayton plan. In a long televised speech given on Tuesday evening, Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the Serb "parliament" in Pale, who generally plays a role as moderator within the governing team, announced the unilateral breaking-off of all relations with the Croatian-Bosnian Federation, and called on all Serbs who want to stay in or travel in areas controlled by the Federation to return to the Serbian Republic of Bosnia. On Wednesday the Implementation Force admitted that its command had not been in contact with the military command of Pale for the past six days (a record for breaks in relations between Serb and Western officers).

More importantly, the various mechanisms for stabilizing peace have broken down one after another. In Vienna the Serbian delegation boycotted the committee on disarmament. In Pale the Bosnian military mission, which was meant to be set up next Friday, has postponed its arrival indefinitely. In Sarajevo the temporary election committee has halted its preparatory work for the elections in the absence of the Serb representative. The same goes for the joint committee on war prisoners. This committee's sessions are pointless since the Serbian side is absent. In the suburbs, on the bridge separating Sarajevo from Grbavica, there has been a sudden crackdown in traffic checks. During the afternoon in Ilidza a bus was targeted by snipers. In short, there is a crisis atmosphere.

Shortly after the Dayton agreement was reached, Holbrooke went so far as to plan in a number of tense

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moments and mini-breakdowns due to the plan's complexity. Are we witnessing one of these? Are we seeing an understandable and innocuous slowdown of the process, something we would be mistaken to dramatize? Or is this episode involving the Serb military prisoners proving to be the first opportunity — on either side, and indeed on both sides — to draw a question mark over the Dayton agreement and to renegotiate some of its fundamental points (e.g., legal prosecution, the reunification of the capital, the legitimacy of either side)? Probably all of the above. In any case, in the confusion which reigns today in Bosnia, nobody can assess the true seriousness of this first setback in the peace process.

B-H: Analyst: DIA Organized Kidnapping of Serb Officers

AU1502140096 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 14 Feb 96 p 4

[Report by Vesna Hadzivukovic: "Americans Preparing New Kidnappings; It Might Happen Soon That the Serb Republic Army Will Remain Without Its Most Important Staff and Field Officers"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In the kidnapping of the senior Serb officers, the Muslims acted in accordance with the instructions of DIA (U.S. military intelligence service) agents who operate in Sarajevo under the NATO umbrella.

This was stated especially for TELEGRAF by a senior Western analyst of the work of intelligence services who, in the past, was a high-ranking intelligence officer himself.

According to non-U.S. sources in IFOR [Implementation Force], the Muslims, The Hague tribunal, and even IFOR themselves were merely marionettes, while the strings were pulled by far more serious players. The circumstances in which the kidnapping took place remain a mystery, and only the direct participants and planners know the details. According to the semi-official versions from the Serb Republic Army Command, General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic were supposed to meet with the representatives of the civilian authorities and also IFOR officers in Ilidza, the soon-to-be former Serb municipality.

Contrary to the usual procedure, the meeting with IFOR was called only a couple of hours earlier. According to IFOR, this meeting was officially never supposed to take place. Unofficially, IFOR command is searching frantically for those who had brokered this "non-existent meeting." Furthermore, a senior British officer hinted to TELEGRAF that any assistance in ascertaining the identity of those who called the meeting in the name of IFOR would help clarify the background of this case.

"All this could mean that IFOR was either unfair or clumsy. And we are rarely clumsy," this officer said, adding that the kidnapping could come as a result of information "leaking from IFOR to the Muslims."

However, a high-ranking Western intelligence source, who insists on his anonymity, stated especially for TELEGRAF:

"The DIA is behind it all. I suspect that even the White House does not have a clear picture of what the ultimate goals of the DIA presence in Bosnia are. The DIA took a fantastic quantity of bugging and surveillance equipment there. The vehicle in which the Serb officers were travelling was followed from the air. For them, Gen. Djukic, who, as it is known, is the chief of logistics, and Col. Krsmanovic, perhaps the most important Serb officer on the Sarajevo front, are the most valuable sources of information. Also, do not forget that a not-at-all-negligible number of the Hague investigators are CIA and DIA members. I would not be surprised at all if they were precisely the ones who are investigating 'the war crimes' of the Serb officers. However, one thing is sure — many things will depend on the outcome of this kidnapping. If the Americans get what they need, and without many unpleasant questions being asked, a wide-scale operation will begin. This operation could soon strip the Serb Republic Army of its most important officers, not only staff officers, but also those from the front. This would mean the end of the Serb Army, morally and physically. I do no know whether you over there have the chance to ever look at the programs of the Sarajevo media, however, here in the West, certain circles have observed that the war trumpets have been sounded again. In the near future, the Serbs could encounter unpleasant surprises. So could the Croats."

When asked whether IFOR was also involved in this operation, our collocutor said:

"I cannot be categorical. IFOR, as a whole was certainly not involved. Individuals — perhaps. I, personally, would not trust anyone. Neither the French, nor the Russians, nobody! DIA agents do not need IFOR personnel for such actions. Furthermore, I am convinced that they also control the communications systems of the international forces. It is possible that the meeting with the Serb officers was called bypassing IFOR. It is virtually impossible to protect oneself from such 'temporary usurpations of communications.'"

"The Serb Republic — that is, its army — should, in the future, realize the contacts with IFOR exclusively

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on the territory under Serb control," was the reply to TELEGRAF's question of how to prevent such and similar kidnappings. "However, then the international community will deem the Serbs the biggest culprits for the violations of the Dayton agreement and a possible beginning of a new round of war. The second possibility is that the Serbs should maintain the illusion of trusting these somewhat faded blue routes, however, with the greatest possible caution. I repeat, with the greatest possible caution! The Serbs must also request physical protection for the Serb envoys from IFOR. They might as well find something for the IFOR officers and soldiers to do. [passage omitted]

B-H: Federation To Control Serb Suburbs by Deadline

AU1502155596 Paris AFP in English
1427 GMT 15 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 15 (AFP) — Full Bosnian Federation authority will return to rebel Serb-held suburbs ringing Sarajevo by the deadline set in the Dayton accords, the deputy to Bosnia's High Representative said Thursday [15 February].

Michael Steiner, deputy to the High Representative, Carl Bildt, said a plan to put police forces from the Moslem Croat Federation into a number of areas currently under Serb authority by March 19 was "practically ready".

The move is the final step in transferring authority from the rebel Serbs back to the Bosnian Government in line with the Dayton peace accords for Bosnia.

It would done "step by step" one district at a time, Steiner said adding that the local Serb leadership and the Federation authorities had been informed "how we intend to introduce the Federation police," Steiner told reporters Thursday.

"By D plus 91 (March 20) Federation police will have full authority in these areas of Sarajevo," Steiner said. Formally, the Serb-held districts have been under Federation authority since February 3 however under a special ruling by Bildt's office Bosnian Serb police were permitted to stay in place.

Steiner said the deadline for the deployment of the police was not up for negotiation. "We are not in a negotiating phase anymore. What I say is what will happen," he added.

Anxiety among the Serb population over the reception that awaits them once the city's mainly Moslem police force return to patrolling these areas prompted the concession. Emotions run high in these areas from where rebel Serb forces cleared out its non-Serb population and laid siege to the capital for some three and a half years.

In an effort to smooth the transfer, Ambassador Steiner also announced a series of measures to improve the districts and called on Bosnian government leaders to make "the right political signals".

If "those signals come from this side of the city and local Serb authorities act responsibly, we will have a good chance of a smooth transfer," Steiner stated.

In parrallel with the introduction of the police, schools would be reconstructed, utilities repaired and roads reopened so that living conditions will be improved in the relevant areas.

Furthermore, people in these areas from other parts of Bosnia and not living in their own homes would not be forced out until offered alternative accomodation, Steiner said.

The Moslem-Croat Federation is one of the two political entities comprising post-war Bosnia, first created in 1994. It will control just over a half of the country with the Bosnian Serb Republic in the other half.

Federation police, Steiner explained, would be "clearly identifiable" as such and would reflect the pre-war ethnic composition of the areas they were deployed in. Their numbers would reflect "international norms" and cannot make arrests or enter people's homes "without due process."

Many Serbs in the area due for transfer, thought to number anywhere between 30,000 and 70,000, have threatened to leave rather than live under Moslem-led Bosnian government control.

In addition, though contact has been maintained with local Serb political leaders, the Bosnian Serbs continue to boycott joint meetings between the government and Serb sides held under the auspices of the High Representative.

Any "professional, Bosnian Serb policeman who is not indicted by the war crimes tribunal", Steiner added, would be able to join the federal police units. Without giving details, the High Representative's deputy said some officers had already expressed an interest.

Under the Dayton accords, no one indicted or suspected of committing war crimes during Bosnia's conflict by The Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia can hold office.

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B-H: Serb Assembly Endorses Decision on Sarajevo Exodus

AU1602121596 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 16 Feb 96 p 3

[Report by M. Kusmuk: "The Decision on Moving Out Has Been Made"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At its session in Grbavica yesterday, the Assembly of Serb Sarajevo made a political decision allowing people to move out of those parts of the city that will go back to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the Dayton agreement.

The municipal assemblies have been asked to immediately embark on registering the property of citizens who want to leave the territory of Serb Sarajevo and recording all household property so that they can claim adequate financial compensation. The Assembly of Serb Sarajevo is demanding that the Government of the Serb Republic ensure safety in moving out and accommodation for those who want it, and is asking the international community to provide help for the 30,000 families that are leaving Serb Sarajevo. The city assembly is asking the international community for help in the reconstruction of those parts of Serb Sarajevo that will remain within the Serb Republic. Regarding the emigration, priority will be given to the families of fighters who were killed or disabled in the war. The city assembly is asking the relevant republican institutions to set the date urgently for the evacuation of Serb Sarajevo.

B-H: Izetbegovic, Croatian FM Fail To Agree on Mostar

LD1602131096 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 16 Feb 96

[Dispatch from Sarajevo by HINA correspondent Ranko Mavrak]

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, received Mate Granic, Croatia's deputy prime minister and foreign minister, in Sarajevo today.

In a press statement issued after the talks, Minister Granic stressed that the talks were frank and constructive. We discussed the strengthening of the Federation and overall relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, as well as European integrations, relations with third countries, and the problem of Mostar.

Our conclusion was that everything that hampers the strengthening of the Federation should be eliminated, Minister Granic said. He explained that this means ensuring complete freedom of movement throughout the Federation's territory, complete religious and political freedom, and compliance with all provisions of the Washington and Dayton agreements.

The Croatian foreign minister stressed that he and Izetbegovic did not go into details of the problem of Mostar, but left it up to Mayors Brajkovic and Orucevic. Minister Granic stressed that his talks with Izetbegovic focused exclusively on issues in principle. We believe that certain modifications, which will only bring improvement, should be introduced, Granic said in response to a question about the Croatian side's stand on [EU Administrator] Koschnick's proposal on Mostar.

President of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency Alija Izetbegovic said that the core of the problem in Mostar is freedom and democracy. Complete freedom of movement and of religious and political activity must be established and the concept of private property reinforced. The return of people to their homes must be ensured. When this happens, it will be possible to solve all problems, Izetbegovic believes. He stressed that he told Minister Granic that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government stands firmly behind Hans Koschnick's plan. This plan itself is already a compromise and we do not think that we can make a compromise of a compromise, Izetbegovic said.

After the talks with President Izetbegovic, Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic started talks with the leaders of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

B-H: Mostar Croats Against Bosnian FM's Solution

LD1502212296 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 15 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with yesterday's statement by Bosnian Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic on the [future] administrative system in Mostar, the Municipal Council of Mostar has issued a public statement, which we carry in full:

The statement by Bosnian Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic, which was carried by the media on 14 February, and in which he supported the administrative system for the city of Mostar in accordance with the principle of there being six municipalities and one district, is not in keeping with the Dayton Agreement or with the conclusions of the Presidential Council of the Croat Republic... [bulletin interrupted for a few seconds] ...the setup for the city of Mostar, as Minister Prlic sees it, above all runs counter to the interests of the Croat people, says the statement by the Municipal Council, signed by Mile Puljic, Municipal Council vice president.

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B-H: Croats Ready for 'Further Sacrifices' Over Mostar

LD1502213396 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 15 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The head of the Association of Victims of the Homeland War of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, Zoran Prskalo on behalf of HVIDRA [Association of Croatian Soldiers Maimed in the War], Jasna Zvomislic on behalf of the families of dead defenders, and Stefo Masatovic on behalf of the Association of the Displaced and Croats Made Refugees of Bosnia-Herzegovina, have sent an open letter to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. They expressed their dissatisfaction with the pace of the implementation of the Dayton agreement, and especially with Administrator Hans Koschnick's decision on the set-up of Mostar with the administrative unit of district. The letter expressed support for President Tudjman, and said, among other things:

The new Dayton agreement came after the Muslims obstructed and hampered the implementation of the Washington agreement. Even before the implementation of the Dayton agreement has begun, solutions detrimental for the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina were already being imposed. The best indicator for this is Koschnick's invented district in Mostar, which is completely unacceptable for the Croat people. The Croat people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially those who suffered most during the war, are not satisfied with the results that have been achieved so far in the implementation of the Washington and Dayton agreements. We do not want to wait for any new agreements that will push us even further away from our wish and goal to ensure for us and our sons a secure and dignified life in a community with the united Croat nation.

You have the right and the obligation to advocate and protect the interests of all Croats. We want you to and believe that you represent our interests too, and we give you our full support in that. We also express our readiness to make further concessions and sacrifices if that is necessary in order to achieve fully all the interests of the Croat people.

B-H: Croat Policemen Patrolling Mostar Croat Sector

LD1602121796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1123 GMT 16 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 16 (TANJUG) — The western, Croat, part of the southern Bosnian city of Mostar, divided between Muslims and Croats, is patrolled by 100 policemen from Croatia since early Friday [16 February], the Croatian radio has said.

The radio said that Croatian policemen have come to assist the police department of the Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosnia.

Bosnian Croats proclaimed the Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosnia in 1992, after the civil war in Bosnia begun.

An earlier agreement between Mostar's E.U. administrator German Hans Koschnick and Croatia's Interior Minister Ivan Jarnjak to include these policemen in the E.U. police force and deploy them in both parts of the town, has not been observed, the radio said.

The radio quoted Interior Minister of the Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosnia Ivan Vrankic as saying that the security situation in the republic, and especially in Mostar, was 'not quite ideal.'

The radio said that Muslims were again provoking Croats by playing loud Islamic music from eastern Mostar minarets.

The Muslim Radio Sarajevo recently accused Croats in Mostar for another provocation, after they rejected Koschnick's idea on a single Muslim-Croat central district in Mostar.

The Muslim radio said that Croats had laid a foundation stone for a Roman Catholic cathedral in the centre of the city.

Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina joined hands in 1992 to drive about 40,000 local Serbs out from the Mostar area, after which they fiercely fought each other for almost a year in 1993.

The fighting stopped in early March 1994, when they agreed, under strong pressure from Washington, to create the Muslim-Croat Federation, which divided the city of Mostar, but did not remove tensions between Muslims and Croats.

B-H: Croatian Police To Assist Koschnick Attack Probe

AU1502182396 Paris AFP in English 1754 GMT 15 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Feb 15 (AFP) — Four Croat police from western Mostar will cooperate with their European Union counterparts in an investigation into the February 7 attack on the city's EU administrator Hans Koschnick, an EU police spokesman said Thursday [15 February].

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The joint inquiry, which begins Friday, will be the first contact between the EU police force and the Croat administration of western Mostar since the municipality's rejection of Koschnick's administrative plan for the divided city.

Koschnick escaped injury in the incident, in which around 10 shots were fired at his armoured car after it was surrounded by angry Croat protestors. EU representatives said around 10 Croat police stood by without intervening.

The situation in western Mostar had calmed recently, EU police spokesman Howard Fox said, though members of the EU police force are currently patrolling the demarcation line in the inner city without their Croat or Moslem counterparts.

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Croatia: FM Granic Interviewed on Personal Life

LD1502233196 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2055 GMT 15 Feb 96

[Studio interview with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic by reporter Zeljka Ogresta on 15 February — recorded; conducted in front of a studio audience]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Ogresta] Dr. Granic, How is your family?

[Granic] Very well, as far as I am aware. [laughter]

[Ogresta] How is your brother?

[Granic] Very well.

[Ogresta] Seriously?

[Granic] Yes.

[Ogresta] Recently, in public there has been a lot of argument about your relations — relations between Goran Granic [opposition candidate for mayor of Zagreb] and Mate Granic. Have you quarrelled? Do you speak to each other? How are your relations?

[Granic] We are always on very good terms.

[Ogresta] Although you have different views on some things?

[Granic] This is a basic democratic right. But as regards our relations, they have always been very good.

[Ogresta] Tell me, when your family are together do you talk politics a lot?

[Granic] Sometimes we talk about this. Clearly our discussions are very dynamic. Each person defends what he thinks.

[Ogresta] Excuse me. I have heard that you two, generally speaking, in these family gatherings, are very disciplined, but that your wives make a lot of noise. [laughter]

[Granic] They are both very temperamental, and the most important thing is that they are relatives, too. So everything remains within the family.

[Ogresta] Everything remains in the family. Good. Let us finally resolve this dilemma: Is it true that when it came to a vote, you did not want to vote against your brother? Or what happened in this voting?

[Granic] I was not present during the voting. [laughter]

[Ogresta] You were not there. That was a stroke of luck, eh?

[Granic] No, I went outside. That is also a basic democratic right.

[Ogresta] Of course. There have been such cases before as well, perhaps? [applause] Tell me, Dr. Granic, how does the mother of two such different sons — different, that is, in terms of their politics — react? Does she try and bring you together politically?

[Granic] Well, that is not the most important thing for her. What she is most interested in is to see that we have good family relations. And since this has never been brought into question, she is calm.

[Ogresta] Yes, of course. Dr. Granic, you had a magnificent career as a doctor. I must admit that all the doctors I have spoken to have had very nice things to say about your capabilities as a medical doctor. [passage omitted]

[Ogresta] Can you tell me, does a diplomat always have to be calm and moderate, or can he sometimes shout a bit? I notice that you are always calm and you never explode. Have you ever become furious?

[Granic] Well, it is a great advantage if you can control yourself. That is a big advantage, but that does not mean that one never explodes.

[Ogresta] So you have exploded?

[Granic] Yes, once, I got very angry — at Dayton one night at 0400 in the morning, when I shouted at the U.S. secretary of state.

[Ogresta] You bellowed at him, did you? I bet. [applause] I cannot imagine what that must have looked like. Was he frightened?

[Granic] Holbrooke... [changes thought] You must ask them that. But the idea he proposed came to nothing.

[Ogresta] So you won the argument. So you can act in a different way!

[Granic] Of course. But in reality this happens rarely.

[Ogresta] Dr. Granic, let us talk about some topical things — the Mostar crisis. What I want to know is: Did the demonstrations in Mostar take place independently of Zagreb, and Zagreb later protected them, or did things happen in coordination with Zagreb?

[Granic] I was in China at the time.

[Ogresta] So you have no idea?

[Granic] No, I have no idea. [laughter] No. I am very well informed, because I am in contact with my people every two hours. What happened had no connection whatsoever with Zagreb. Demonstrations are one thing and the attack on Koschnick is another. Demonstrations are a democratic right. Everyone has the right to take part in them in the framework of the law. But the attack on Koschnick was another matter. So we condemn

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the attack on Koschnick, but the demonstrations are different.

[Ogresta] Will Croatia have to pay a tribute because of certain events in Herzegovina?

[Granic] Well, this is a complex issue. I would say the following: The Croat people were in the worst position because they were the smallest in number and most sensitive to change. If 50 percent of the Croat people were to move to Croatia or to a third country, then there would be no more than 400,000 of them. So they are certainly very sensitive to any changes. Primarily as a result of the Serb aggression, there was a great deal of suffering and ethnic cleansing during the conflict with the Muslims. This has been repeated. So people are very frustrated. I repeat: I am not talking about individuals who want neither the Federation nor any (?exchange of options). They have some interests of their own. But as regards the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they certainly need help in order to stabilize themselves, in order to make the Federation stable, and so that everything might proceed in a European direction.

[Ogresta] What is it with that Council of Europe? First they would like to accept us, then they would not, then they would again, and then again, not. Could they accept us together with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia? [passage omitted]

[Granic] Of course, after the capture of Krajina there were pressures over certain undesirable things that happened after Storm. But when we did everything as best possible, they are now pressuring us over Mostar. I believe that we will overcome that, but it is logical that there should be pressures over Mostar. [passage omitted]

[Ogresta] Your former deputy, Mr. Sanader, recently became the head of the president's office. I would like to know whether, seeing as he is your former deputy, you find it easier to have contacts with the president now?

[Granic] I have direct access to the president. [passage omitted]

I think that one of the important reasons why I entered politics was the creation of a democratic Croatia in which there will be no differences between the Croats in Croatia and the Croats in the diaspora, no differences between the Croats in Herzegovina versus the Croats in Zagreb, Dalmatia, or anywhere else. That was one of my motives for entering politics. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Structure of Intelligence Services Examined

AU1502185096 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 6 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Davor Gnjero: "Has the Fight for Tudjman's Legacy Started?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatia has a new chief of the National Security Office [UNS], the Croatian umbrella secret service. This job was held for about a year by Tudjman's oldest son Miroslav, who had in fact been appointed only as acting chief of the service. Tudjman junior is the director of the Croatian Information Service [HIS], one of the five security services in the country. Apart from HIS, which has been envisaged as an analytical service, there are two military secret services, the intelligence and counterintelligence services, then the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order, which operates within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Security Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The UNS is accountable directly to the president of the republic. Its legal powers are such that it can even control the work of the government.

This department was originally formed under the name of the Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order by Josip Manolic, who came to this job from the post of prime minister. Manolic left the office in 1993 and took up the post of chairman of the Assembly's Chamber of Counties. In 1994, he came into conflict with Tudjman and founded the Croatian Independent Democrats together with like-minded people. The animosity between Tudjman and Manolic became exceptionally intense, and during 1994 all secret services in Croatia were shaken by internal clashes and the "squeezing out of Manolic's people." After Manolic, the office was headed by another former prime minister, Hrvoje Sarinic, who was also the chief negotiator with Milosevic's regime. After Sarinic had returned to the post of head of Tudjman's office, the job was taken over by Krunoslav Oluic, who had been public prosecutor prior to that.

Oluic had "institutionalized" the work of the service and created legal infrastructure in its work. He left the UNS to become head of the Supreme Court. In the middle of last year, when Oluic left the service, Miroslav Tudjman was appointed head of the service. All the previous chiefs of the umbrella secret service had belonged to the party's [Croatian Democratic Community] moderate wing, and in the case of all of them, with the exception of Manolic, who used to be a police official in the old regime, the main reference for getting the job was distinct loyalty to President Tudjman.

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The newly appointed chief of the Office, Luka Bebic, is an agronomist. During the previous assembly convocation he was the head of the Committee for Defense and National Security. In 1991, before Gojko Susak took over from him, he was defense minister. Bebic is one the most well-known representatives of the radical wing of the ruling party that has come to this very influential post. In public, Bebic is known as a close friend of Vladimir Seks, deputy chairman of the assembly, and the chief party ideologist who is currently one of the most prominent people in the HDZ's [Croatian Democratic Community] "anti-corruption campaign." His name is also associated with the Metkovici eavesdropping affair. The recordings of his conversations over mobile telephone with his political proteges in Metkovici, which led to the accusations that he was involved in corruption scandals, have at the same time opened the "national security" problem and raised the question of punishment for those who were not authorized to eavesdrop on the senior assembly official who was put in charge of controlling the state security mechanisms.

Fierce Battle Between the Moderates and the Radicals

Within the ruling party there is a very "fierce" battle between the moderates and the radicals. The public has even heard about some polemics between Bebic's patron Seks and the most prominent member of the moderate faction, Franjo Greguric. The radicals want to use the anti-corruption campaign to banish the moderates from the party and state leadership and shift the blame and the public odium for the rampant crime in the privatization of the Croatian economy onto the party moderates. By taking control of the secret services, they have strengthened their position significantly. They already control the Army via Defense Minister Susak. The minister of the interior, Ivan Jarnjak, belongs to the party's moderate wing, but his real influence is significantly smaller than that of Bebic. The importance of the UNS is being stressed in particular as the state leadership does not have confidence in the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (successor of UDBA [state security service of the former Yugoslavia]), which they still consider too much saturated with "cadres from the old regime."

Analysts in Croatia are linking Miroslav Tudjman's removal from the top position in the Office to the possible "struggle for legacy" in the ruling party. The possibility of Franjo Tudjman not taking part in the 1997 elections is being considered, and some people have already started treating his son Miroslav as "crown prince." With his departure to a less important post these voices will wither away and the party's radicals will for the first time have all the state's mechanisms of coercion under their control. In such circumstances it is not difficult to see who in this game has clear advantage.

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FYROM: Commentary Examines Greek Relations

AU1402120696 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 7 Feb 96 p 2

[Commentary by Zoran Andonovski: "Blank Pages in a Friendship"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbian-Greek friendship was taken as a fact and indubitable truth that did not need any verification during this tumultuous decade in the Balkans.

It is as if the two countries had a centuries-long and traditional friendship and that they had nurtured spiritual, cultural, religious, and other kinds of common spirits, but if we go back in history, we will find little justification for this belief and many counterarguments to this myth. The passions in Belgrade and Athens were reestablished after Belgrade's request to renew the agreement on a free zone in Salonika Harbor, but also concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations between Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia].

The episode related to the basketball game last summer—when the fight spilled onto the playground, affecting the media and the public in both countries—was further evidence of the fragility of this friendship. Official Belgrade has not yet responded to the Greek protest against expressions of animosity toward the Greek nation heard in the Serbian capital at that time.

According to all the facts, these spontaneous demonstrations filled with slogans such as "Macedonia, Macedonia" and "Cyprus is Turkish" made the Greek public aware of the "real" Serbian friendship. This was not the end of it. In reference to these events, Belgrade's POLITIKA wrote last summer: "We must definitely realize that we have lived for years in an illusion that the Greeks were our friends." However, the Serbs soon forgot this warning, but now they are reminded of it again.

When Milosevic, Papandreou, and Mitsotakis before him were in the "greatest love," we all forgot that Greek-Serbian history contains "blank" pages as well, which are completely opposite from the largely accepted myth of the two countries' absolute friendship. Whenever the two nationalities had chosen opposite blocs and reached for the same piece of Balkan pie, the alliance would fall. For instance, in the last century, besides the Greek-Bulgarian competition, there was also the Greek-Serbian competition concerning Macedonia's division. The latter was even transformed into a street fight between the Greek and Serbian armies during the Balkan Wars (the battle for Bitola and Lerin, for instance). In 1941, Athens first offered the Kingdom of SHS [Serbs-Croats-Slovenians] the region around and including Lerin [Florina], but the government in Belgrade signed an agreement with the Third Reich on its association with the Axis in return for which Germany would give it [Belgrade] Salonika. After the overthrow of the Cvetkovic-Macek government, this agreement was annulled, but Athens' feelings about Serbian territorial pretensions are still present....

The latest sparkles on the Belgrade-Athens line regarding the renewal of the agreement on a free zone in Salonika Harbor are nothing but a continuation of misunderstandings, showdowns, and struggles that these two countries have been waging in the last two centuries. FRY's insistence on getting a part of the harbor was received with a wrinkled forehead, and the Serbian inclination to Athens was proclaimed as "unilateral" after Greece's defiance. This is how Belgrade's NIN comments on Greece's defiance to Milosevic's proposal for confederation and to Athens' speedy recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and not FRY.

"The example of unilateral love is fresh in recent history: We fell in love with Greece, we proposed marriage. By the end of 1994, the Yugoslav press published the news that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, during his eight-hour (love at first sight) visit to Athens, had thrown a 'diplomatic' bomb in the Balkans, which gave his Greek counterparts reasons for deep thinking. It was confirmed that his initiative—which has been a subject of speculation for a long time—for the formation of a Balkan federation or a regional community on the north-south axis, from Belgrade to Athens via Skopje, was really proposed and examined. (This is why we said at the beginning that two are needed for love, probably even three). The bride was not ready. A day or two later, the Greek press published that the Serbian president's proposal had come at an 'inappropriate time for Greece,' and officials even said that 'to raise such a question is beyond any reason.' The worst part of all was that Greece recognized Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992, while it 'let down' its wooer. Not only did the bridegroom lack money to buy the bride an expensive present, but it also aspired to the dowry." At that time, the Greek press wrote that the FRY had territorial pretensions toward its country, NIN says, and it continues as follows:

"This is why the expected answer arrived in December 1995: Greece announces that it is not ready to renew the agreement on the transit of Yugoslav goods through the free zone in Salonika Harbor. It does not matter. We love Greece and Greece loves us!

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"Macedonia is not excluded from our love, but they announce from there [Macedonia] that they would like to be called by their real name, not by a nickname, which is the why the normalization of relations between the FRY and the Republic of Macedonia have been postponed," the Belgrade weekly concludes.

It seems that "our Serbian friends" did not realize that Greece was looking forward to the expiration of the 50-year long concession in order to establish their own power over the whole region in the harbor and that the temporary "renting" of Thessaloniki Harbor cannot be legal after the overthrow of the colonels' regime in Greece. Perhaps they were aware of all this but they hoped that their "offer"—not to recognize Macedonia or to recognize it by its "nickname"—would be sufficiently attractive for Athens to open the doors of Thessaloniki Harbor. It was at this moment that the regime in Belgrade, which was, by the way, sending signals to Skopje that the recognition can only be done by the constitutional name, was greatly surprised and disappointed: The survey of the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milutinovic during his last visit to Athens showed that Greece will not have any objections if the FRY establishes diplomatic relations with Macedonia and if it recognizes it by its constitutional name!

The shock has not been overcome yet. Now Belgrade does not have any justifications for delaying the establishment of relations with Macedonia, because the justification with which Milutinovic travelled to Athens is not valid any longer. The reason for the bitterness of the Belgrade regime lies in the fact that Macedonia was the test of their loyalty to the agreements that were signed with the international community and an obstacle to Belgrade's admission in the European Union. This bitterness was added to the misunderstandings and the protests that it is faced with by its own people and media, which do not approve the prolongation of the inevitable recognition....

FYROM: DP, PDPA Fault Government Reorganization

AU1402133796 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1430 GMT 12 Feb 96

[Report by Ilija Maksimovski and Mira Kostic on news conferences held by the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians and the Democratic Party on 12 February]

[FBIS Translated Text] "According to the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians [PDPA]," Ilija Maksimovski reports, "everything that is taking place in connection with the reorganization of the government, including the events that have taken place in Macedonian Radio and Television recently, have been planned and arranged by some Macedonian, but also some Albanian politicians, and they are against the democratic interests of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. PDPA representatives gave a negative assessment to President Kiro Gligorov's recent public address because, as they said, he is not entitled to address all the Republic's citizens because he was the candidate of the Alliance for Macedonia at the last elections. This was said to be an indication that the president does not have real political power and that we are in the initial phase for controlled turmoil in the country. The PDPA announced that it would not vote for the government reorganization and that it would support a possible parliamentary initiative for new elections, as well as that it would collect the 150,000 signatures that are necessary to organize early elections in the county. The news conference was held in the Albanian language, which meant that it was difficult to report about the conference itself".

Mira Kostic reports from the news conference held by the Democratic Party [DP]: "Pointing out that saying that the Alliance for Macedonia will survive is the same as what the Serbian leadership said about the continuation of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] even if some of its members were not there, DP President Petar Gosev said that finally everybody has understood that the Alliance [for Macedonia] was formed with an ultimately basic and pragmatic goal and that there had not been any other goals."

As Petar Gosev said: "By dismissing the leadership of the Liberal Party and by putting Kiro Gligorov in the margins, the new concentration of political and economic power will be placed in the hands of a smaller number of powerful persons, which will give a new impetus to authoritarian and nondemocratic rule. Our political and civil rights will now depend even more on the wealth that will be required as a condition for joining such clans and leaderships, as well as on party and clan affiliations."

Petar Gosev underlined that holding regular, fair, and democratic elections is now the only way to resolve the present situation, on which subject the DP has already held discussions with a number of opposition parties. He said that now the road to gathering 150,000 signatures of the citizens has been opened.

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FYROM: Air Traffic Control, Radar at Skopje Airport

96BA0118C Skopje VECER in Macedonian 27 Dec 95 p 5

[Unattributed Article: "The First Main Radar in Operation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, at a suitable location, the first main radar controlling air space and air traffic began operations not far from Skopje's airport. This lays the foundations of the antiaircraft defense system of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and, at the same time, exercises sovereignty over the air space.

The inauguration of the main radar was attended by high-ranking representatives of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transportation and Relations, including Major General Janakie Manasievski and Colonel Mile Manolev, commander of the Air Force and Antiaircraft Defense, representing the General Staff of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia; Goran Pavlov and members of the flight control system represented the Civilian Airflight Directorate.

These activities allow the Republic of Macedonia to become a member of the Central European Regional Air Initiative, which implies the establishment of a joint civilian-military control and protection of the air space and the air traffic, to be developed by a team of experts from both ministries.

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Poland: Kwasniewski on Ties, NATO Integration, Oleksy

AU1502114596 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 14 Feb 96 pp 1-2

[Interview with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski by Zoltan Szalai in Warsaw; date not given: "Hungary Is Close"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow is against NATO itself, rather than only against NATO expansion. Moscow continues to regard NATO as an anti-Russian bloc and a relic of the Cold War. If we can make the Russians understand that this is not so, we will have no problems with NATO expansion, Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski declared in an interview he gave to Hungarian correspondents in Warsaw, including the NEPSZABADSAG correspondent. Before his coming official visit to Budapest on 16 February, President Kwasniewski spoke about bilateral relations, as well as NATO integration, the Oleksy affair, the new government in Warsaw, and his relations with Walesa.

[Szalai] Budapest is your fourth trip abroad. Does this also mean that Hungary is Warsaw's fourth-most-important partner?

[Kwasniewski] Of course, there is political significance in the order of visits, so it was not accidental that my first trips took me to Bonn, Paris, and Brussels. Immediately after these trips come the meetings with the Visegrad countries, including Hungary. Hungary is a very close partner for us. I already met with President Arpad Goncz twice recently, in Paris and in Davos. I also know Prime Minister Gyula Horn and Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs well.

[Szalai] Do you feel any rivalry between our two countries?

[Kwasniewski] There is a natural rivalry—for example, over which country can attract most foreign capital. However, there is no competition between us regarding the implementation of the mutual goals of euro-atlantic integration. I believe that the four Visegrad countries will become EU and NATO members at approximately the same time.

[Szalai] You have not made any statements about the Oleksy affair recently. Why?

[Kwasniewski] The reason is quite simple: I cannot be the judge, prosecutor, or attorney in this case. All the more so because I am not fully acquainted with the material currently in the hands of the military prosecution. As president, my task is to guarantee that the case be solved in a legal framework and in accordance with democratic norms. Besides, it was clear from the very start that, if the Prosecutor's Office opened an investigation, Oleksy would have to resign, and Oleksy also agreed with this. Oleksy uttered perhaps the most dramatic sentence of recent years: "I resign because I am innocent."

[Szalai] In view of all this, was it a mistake on the part of the social-democrats to elect Oleksy to the position of party chairman, a position you left for the presidency?

[Kwasniewski] I do not think this was a false step. The decision rests on the assumption of innocence: We do not treat the person as guilty as long as we do not have proof. I do not see why the Social Democratic Party should have taken up the prosecutor's role. The most important thing is that we succeeded in restraining the crisis, and I hope that the new cabinet led by Cimoszewicz will receive confidence this week.

[Szalai] However, the Oleksy affair has weakened Poland's international position.

[Kwasniewski] I do not think our position has weakened because we dealt with the issue according to the democratic norms to the very end. Of course, those who are less sympathetic toward Poland tried to make use of this situation. At the same time, I think it is nonsense to claim that we will have problems with our NATO membership because of the Oleksy affair. The issue of NATO expansion has nothing to do with the Oleksy affair; it has a lot to do with Russian opposition, instead. Of course, the West must also take Moscow's interests into consideration. In this situation, the viewpoints of Warsaw and Budapest can only be secondary.

[Szalai] Speaking about the Russians, information appeared in the press according to which the Polish social-democrats received considerable financial assistance from Moscow at the beginning of the 1990's. Was that so?

[Kwasniewski] I was the founder and first chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Poland [SdRP], and I can say that we did not receive any assistance from Moscow. The funds that Gorbachev sent to Rakowski at the time went to LEMP [expansion unknown], and we did not know anything about this.

[Szalai] What is your opinion about your predecessor, Walesa?

[Kwasniewski] I greatly respect Walesa as a revolutionary and a Solidarity activist. At the same time, I am critical of his activity as president because he missed the opportunity to unite and stabilize Poland.

[Szalai] The presidential elections divided Poland considerably. How can you bridge this gap?

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[Kwasniewski] Every election divides society; there is nothing unusual in this. However, the postelection atmosphere is strange in Poland, an atmosphere that is more frustrated than generally in other countries.

[Szalai] How do you view the future of the coalition?

[Kwasniewski] In my opinion, the coalition will continue until the next elections because we do not expect internal changes of similar magnitude. I hope we will be able to concentrate on the major tasks after the formation of the new cabinet—namely, on maintaining economic growth, the social programs, and European integration.

Poland: Kwasniewski on Oleksy Case, Policies

WS1402153496 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 17 Feb 96 pp 13-15

[Interview with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski by Janina Paradowska and Jerzy Baczynski in Warsaw; date not given: "Hitchcock's Recipe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [POLITYKA] Mr. President, do you believe that the formation of the Cimoszewicz cabinet ended the political crisis linked to the so-called Oleksy case?

[Kwasniewski] I do hope that it did. Incidentally, I believe it was unfounded to talk about a crisis of state. The state and its institutions, including those that were involved in the so-called Oleksy case, also did what they were supposed to do; the economy functioned without any problems. I believe that it is more proper to talk about a turning-point period, which ended when the current government was formed. The next few months, which will precede the election campaign before the 1997 elections, should be a period of making intensive efforts to handle issues that are most important to the state, not to deal with affairs and scandals. This was the message I conveyed when the Cimoszewicz cabinet was being formed; I said then that I wished all the members of this cabinet to form a cabinet of peace and development.

[POLITYKA] What are the possible threats to this peace and development? How do you perceive them?

[Kwasniewski] Over the first half of the year, the government must not only maintain all of the favorable trends in the economy but also devote its attention to the resolution of three big problems: reform of the social insurance system, health protection, and making significant steps aimed at restructuring the mining, steel, and arms industries. Unless these issues are taken up now, their resolution will be extremely difficult. Therefore, I realize that these problems may cause social tension. The task of the government, as well as that of the prime minister and the president, is to build a political base around these issues; this political base should be as broad as possible, and it should also include support from outside the coalition.

Of course, various political steps can also be taken; however, as I assess the social moods—and my assessment is confirmed by numerous public opinion polls—political destabilization attempts will fail. I cannot see any social support for such actions. As far as stability of the coalition is concerned, I believe that now that the current turning-point period has ended, it is already known that it was the last change in this group before the elections and before the necessity is faced of reporting to the people what has been done. Thus, it is a lasting coalition.

Nonetheless, some problems may arise stemming from the coming elections in Russia. The result is difficult to predict today, and it may cause politicians in Moscow to speak a more aggressive language, which can be seen in the scandalous statements made by Zhyrinovskiy, for instance. In addition, it may cause the West to be more cautious or nervous in its policy of continuing the activities that are to result in our membership in the EU and NATO.

[POLITYKA] How would you yourself comment on the way you acted in that turning-point period? You were quite generally criticized for being too passive and partial.

[Kwasniewski] I believe that my activities in that period were clear and precise all along. I think the fact that this period ended as it did speaks for my success. I was taken aback by the Oleksy case right at the beginning of my term; the style resembled Hitchcock's recipes for a very good film: The film begins with an earthquake, and then the suspense mounts. At the very beginning I assumed that the case must be pursued in line with certain procedures—legal and parliamentary ones. These procedures could not in any way be affected by the president's statements urging a quicker decision. Therefore, from the moment the issue was made public until the prosecutor announced his decision, I did not do anything that could have been interpreted as an attempt to interfere.

I also thought that, when this issue was publicized, we witnessed a veritable outbreak of hysteria and dishonesty in some media, which handed down their rulings and used information that had been leaked to them; this is seen as a scandal in every country. Any public statements or visible involvement on my part would only have caused additional commotion. Therefore, I kept at a distance from those developments. Finally, the third problem was to guarantee Poland

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external credibility in this difficult period, which I certainly managed to achieve. All of my foreign visits and international contacts prove that the world is looking at us more calmly than we are looking at ourselves; they prove that it trusts us and that it trusts our legal procedures; they also prove that it is convinced of the economic opportunities we now have. I told all of my foreign partners—and this calmed them—that the issue was being resolved in line with legal and parliamentary procedures, which proved that Poland is able to overcome such crises.

[POLITYKA] However, here is what you kept saying: I trust Prime Minister Oleksy, there is no problem [as published] with his dismissal. You did not keep an equal distance.

[Kwasniewski] I disagree with such an assessment. I spoke about my noninterference in the legal procedures. I spoke about my personal confidence in Oleksy as a man, and I do not withdraw what I said. In general, I do not imagine a situation in which one can make final statements without having sufficient information. I avoided making final statements. Nevertheless, I do think highly of Oleksy's decision to resign.

I believed all along—and so did he, which he later proved—that it would be an inevitable decision if the Prosecutor's Office launched an investigation. In my interviews with Oleksy, I presented this issue clearly, and he fully shared this point of view. I still do not want to be a judge, a prosecutor, or a defense lawyer in this case. I wonder, however, why the fact that I acted in line with the principle of presumed innocence should be used as an argument against me. Please note that in the Willy Claes case the most prominent politicians of the world are not making any final judgments even today because the final decision will be made by a Belgian court of law. An added complication is the fact that, as a consequence of actions taken by some media that took advantage of leaks of unknown origin, a hysteria was produced that the entire social democratic party is linked to external forces. We nearly found ourselves in the sphere of political fiction [last two words published in English], where the whole story was written by the special services. I will not accept such theories. If you expect that for political reasons and for the purpose of boosting my image I will cut myself off from Oleksy before the case is clarified, then I must tell you that I will not do this. I think if I did this I would lose something in the eyes of the public, and also I would not have any self-respect. The honorable behavior is to wait until the legal procedures are completed.

[POLITYKA] Now, what exactly is the Oleksy case, do you think?

[Kwasniewski] What is it? Of course, it may be a case of violating the law, but this must be proved. It may also be looked upon as an element of the political campaign, which is going on and in which all kinds of arguments are being used. Now that the elections have been held, I would like to offer a civilized manner in which power and tasks are taken over. I have spoken about my prominent predecessor in office, about appreciation of the role he played, and I proposed creation of a certain political custom in line with which the transfer of power is implemented normally and the results of the elections respected. The only response to this was the visit paid by Minister Bartoszewski and Minister Milczanowski; they gave me a letter from President Walesa, who wrote that, inasmuch as there was a threat to the security of the state, he thereby informed about the Oleksy case. Quite naturally, this aggravated my suspicions, and it increased the distance I kept.

Please understand one thing: Nearly a month had passed since the elections, and there were tens of official issues that should be relayed the moment the new president takes office. There were security issues, international problems, initiatives that were in various stages of implementation, there were some agreements. Meanwhile, the contacts were confined to this issue only. Of course, one can say that it has its gravity and that it certainly is significant, but the situation itself was peculiar and strange. What really surprised me during the initial discussions were the expectations of my interlocutor—that is, the minister of internal affairs. They were of three kinds—Jozef Oleksy was to immediately resign from the office of prime minister. He also expected the prime minister to give up his seat in the Sejm. I asked him: Why the seat? He replied: He is an able man; he may be appointed chairman of some commission and seek revenge. Because various examples were quoted during this talk, including the Brandt case, I recalled that Brandt remained chairman of the party and did not give up his seat in the parliament. The third condition was to keep the group that carried out the intelligence tasks.

If I do not have unquestionable proof on the table and hear such expectations voiced, the question of "why" arises. I asked my interlocutors bluntly: Do you gentlemen imagine that a leading politician can suddenly disappear without any clear reasons for such an action? That night I talked with Oleksy and grasped the tragedy of this man. He told me that first of all this was false. Second, he said if he were to leave right away, what should he tell his son, for one. This was a proposal of suicide—not only political suicide, but civil suicide in general. This is what the proposal really was. Later on I tried to get in touch with Walesa many times.

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[POLITYKA] Was it the so-called Konieczny mission?

[Kwasniewski] The purpose of Konieczny's mission was to lead to a meeting because the entire problem was that there were no meetings. I even did not meet for the third time with Milczanowski, who told me over the phone that President Walesa ordered him not to conduct any further talks. I tried. These are the facts. The purpose of this was for us to sit down together and see what the consequences of this case might be. It is so that one president leaves, another one comes, but Poland will stay and so will the problem. I was open to any proposals to hold meetings with Lech Walesa, with his Chancellery head, Iwanicki. At the meeting on 12 December, I proposed the following solution: Let us leave the issue as it is, and let us set up a team that might examine the materials and see what really is there. Now, if there are fears that someone might stifle something, there is a depository—Minister Andrzej Milczanowski. He did not have to resign. This decision was entirely up to Lech Walesa. The prime minister and I proposed that he stay.

Let me explain this right at the beginning. This was not an effort to keep the case away from legal procedures. However, we faced decisions concerning the interests of the state, its international image. My proposals were turned down. That political context of the issue was, incidentally, far broader—after all, it was Lech Walesa who formulated opinions that the issue had been made public too early, that he had hoped that it would surface in a year or two. Before the case was made public, the WPROST weekly published an article on vague connections the left wing had. Really, under such circumstances it was difficult to agree that all of this was a regular operation of the special services, which happened to catch this trail when they were dealing with some bigger case. As a result of all this, it is next to impossible to answer the question of where the core of the matter really is. At any rate, I do not have such a simple answer.

If someone had accused Oleksy of being too talkative, that his contacts were too broad, that he did not select his friends, that the door of his house was open too wide for various people, and if this were punishable, then he could really be sentenced without a court of law participating in it. All this is true. However, if he is charged with high treason, then we are speaking about a different problem—this must be proved.

[POLITYKA] There is a visible tendency among politicians—and, unfortunately, you are no exception, Mr. President—to put all the blame on the media.

[Kwasniewski] I have the impression that many editorial offices envy Jerzy Urban [chief editor of the NIE weekly], who became successful by revealing various scandals. The entire press cannot be "Urbanized," however. There has to be room for reporting that does not follow every "leak" but checks information and listens to all sides. Meanwhile, in Poland, in the pursuit of scandal that is used for political reasons, the press has become completely "Urbanized." In the fight for readers and with a sense of mission to fulfill, the media's priorities fall in the following order: first scandal, then information, and last, truth.

[POLITYKA] Does that mean you do not see any negligence or errors on your part that might have caused the case to grow as it has?

[Kwasniewski] I do not think I neglected anything in the dialogue that took place between 11 and 19 December. After 19 December, the case took on a life of its own.

[POLITYKA] Apart from the Oleksy case, the issue of the Moscow money came up, which might still go on for some time. You are currently not a party member, but how was it back then?

[Kwasniewski] The loan taken by Mieczyslaw Rakowski [former first secretary of the Polish United Workers Party—PZPR] had nothing to do with the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP]. Rakowski did not even mention it to us, in the belief that this was purely an internal matter of the PZPR. In 1990, when the SdRP was being established, there were absolutely no contacts indicating any interest on the part of the Soviets. No one could have predicted at the time that a group that was soon to rise to power was forming on the ruins of the PZPR. Neither we nor the Soviet Union had such strategists. If I could turn back the clock to 1989, I would change one thing—I would leave all financial and staffing issues of the former PZPR for the Liquidation Commission instead of dealing with them ourselves. Such a solution would have been wiser tactically and strategically. It turned out differently. I absolutely reject all theories that any so-called Primakov plans are being implemented in Poland. That is absurd. Our current relations with Russia are so poor that I think Western politicians have more frequent and better contacts. The contacts have cooled on both sides—I can even say that both sides are afraid to contact each other. The fact that I supported the Russian social democrats in the elections when I was still the SdRP chairman caused a big splash in the media. I supported them because I wanted to prove to the Socialist International that we are ready to support democratic forces in Russia also practically. Unfortunately, the social democrat party did not even make it to the Duma, even though its platform was supported by Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky and

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Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales. Going back to the beginning of the 1990's, we have to clearly state that the CPSU was completely unprepared for the events that came after 1990. The best proof of that is how they ended up. If Zyuganov wins the elections, it will definitely not be because of any Primakov plan. Besides, Primakov is on Yeltsin's team anyway. Zyuganov knows what he wants, he has an organization behind him and people, and his political views are very similar to those of our Deputy Ryszard Bugaj [chairman of the Union of Labor].

[POLITYKA] In the course of the Oleksy affair, however, you came forth with several initiatives that raise serious questions. One of them is the vetting draft, your first legislative initiative.

[Kwasniewski] I will not hide the fact that the draft law on the establishment of a Commission of Public Trust has to do with recent developments. I think that the worst possible situation for a democracy is when it is possible to selectively use various documents from the archives of the secret services. This initiative is not designed to discredit anyone. It is an attempt at reconciling Poles using the knowledge we have and will acquire and that can always be used. The only alternative to establishing the Public Trust Commission is destroying those archives.

[POLITYKA] How does that relate to the Oleksy case?

[Kwasniewski] I am speaking about the general climate, which I thought something should have been done about. If we continue to claim that the entire past requires elucidation, the charges leveled against the SdRP included, we should reach those files and explain everything we can. We should deposit those files in trusted hands and prevent them from being randomly used in political battles. Please note who is trying to be the beneficiary of everything that surrounded the Oleksy case—the extraparliamentary groups, the extremists who are supportive of the vetting law and who are gaining strength at the expense of the political center. I therefore think the wind should be taken out of those sails. This could be done by the Public Trust Commission, which would carry out vetting in a civilized way.

[POLITYKA] Another initiative of yours that remains inconclusive is the ratification of the Concordat.

[Kwasniewski] This is a problem due to the calendar. The deadline by which the Sejm was to review the issue expired on 31 December 1995. I believe it would have been wrong to provoke a new confrontation at the point we reached after the elections, after the presidential campaign. That is why I think we should try to find a reasonable compromise on the matter by constitutional, legal, and practical methods—with respect for the church on the one side, but also for the questions raised by the citizens on the other. These questions must not be neglected. Perhaps the stance of the recent Conference of the Episcopate claiming that the church should distance itself from current politics is a good omen. Perhaps this is our chance to talk and dispel the doubts of both sides. There should be neither winners nor losers in this case—we should reach a reasonable compromise because that is what Poland needs.

[POLITYKA] Finally, there is your stance on the mass enfranchisement referendum. You have never backed out of it, and we do not really know what the stance of the incumbent president is, even though he is officially responsible for it.

[Kwasniewski] I rebut all charges claiming that the presidential office has been passive on the issue of the referendum. If, as some say, the timing is wrong, the blame should be placed on Lech Walesa and the Senate majority that approved it. The decision was made and has to be executed. We must preserve continuity regardless of who is president. I treat this rule very seriously because this is the only way you can build a state. It is a separate issue that mass enfranchisement does not stir up strong emotions anymore, that the hottest topic is that of the National Investment Funds. I myself am for retaining and expanding them. This is, however, the opinion of citizen Aleksander Kwasniewski.

[POLITYKA] You intended to take up several political initiatives under the slogan "A common Poland" and implement them. One of them was establishing the National Security Council. Is this a project you have abandoned altogether?

[Kwasniewski] The project does exist; there is also someone I have asked to consult on the composition of that council. This is Janusz Onyszkiewicz [of the Freedom Union], who has accepted the offer and is already holding his first talks. These talks will continue. I believe there is a need for such a pluralistic council grouping eminent individuals. Regardless of domestic developments, we have to continue with our plans—enter NATO, the EU, the OECD. I think the council should be construed not as an institutional representation made up of party delegates, but as a group of recognized authorities.

[POLITYKA] There is also the problem of the constitution. Its development is slowing down. In the course of the election campaign you claimed 1996 would be the year of the constitution. It probably will not be.

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[Kwasniewski] I still think it would be better to have the constitution before the parliamentary elections. This, however, requires agreement within the Constitutional Commission and the entire National Assembly, which depends on the determination of the deputies and senators from various parties. If, however, it turns out that we will not have a constitution by then and that it will become an element of the 1997 election campaign, I will come forth with a legislative initiative that the new parliament be elected concurrently with new members to the Constitutional Commission, which is at the same time the Constituant Assembly. It would consist of several dozen members elected in a fully proportional vote, without any thresholds, so as to guarantee that the group is truly representational. I wish to stress that this is a fallback plan, yet, if the constitution is not ready by the end of this parliamentary term, the 1992 Law on the Procedure of Passing the Basic Law practically implies that Poland will not have a new constitution by the year 2000.

[POLITYKA] We have hardly spoken of your foreign policy, your foreign visits, which are undeniably very successful. Yet there remain many questions pertaining to domestic issues that you have not yet answered.

[Kwasniewski] Allow me just to say that the international climate is very good. There is huge respect for everything we have accomplished since 1989. This is not a hollow statement—I have held very many talks in my first few weeks in office. I met with the chancellor of Germany, the president of France, the prime minister of Spain, the prime minister of the Czech Republic, the president of Ukraine, the head of the Israeli Government, the chairman of the European Commission, the secretary general of NATO, and several other eminent figures of world politics. These talks have proved my opinion that, if we do not merely focus on our internal conflicts but find a way of solving our own problems, there is a chance that 1996 might be a significant and decisive year as far as Poland's plans and aspirations are concerned.

[POLITYKA] It will be significant and decisive if reforms and economic growth are not hampered. In this context, it is very important what will become of the so-called Package 2000 developed by Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko. What do you think of his suggestions?

[Kwasniewski] I think the economic project currently implemented in Poland is good and effective. The Polish economy is winning today, and, as coach [of the national soccer team] Kazimierz Gorski says, you do not replace a winning team before the end of a match. We are currently observing a stable growth trend, which has to be fostered and positively stimulated. I am convinced that both Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko and [Privatization] Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek can do more for the economy than anyone else.

As for Package 2000, I think it is very ambitious and difficult but feasible. It provides for creating new jobs, higher outlays on social projects, progress in modernizing and restructuring the economy, and reducing the inflation rate.

We are currently in a very delicate phase, where the temptation appears to spend money more lavishly because our economic output is good. We must not yield to this temptation—we cannot be led to believe that we can afford higher spending because we have economic growth. If the high rate of economic growth is maintained at a level of 5-6 percent annually, we could begin to bridge the gap separating us from the highly developed countries of West Europe more visibly. Lower growth, at approximately 4 percent, does not guarantee that. This year and next we must show a lot of determination in economic activity and improve the state of public finances.

I do not have major constitutional prerogatives, but I can contribute to creating a better climate and act as a spokesman for reforms. I will do that, especially as this is much easier for me than for my colleagues from the various political parties, who will soon have to face the challenge of the elections.

[POLITYKA] Thank you for the interview.

Poland: Prospects for Joining NATO Assessed

WS1602121096 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 13 Feb 96 pp 1, 3

[Article by Maksymilian Berezowski: "A Long Way to NATO, or Are We Close? Poland on the March"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The question presented in the title returns to mind after the short but very busy stay of Richard Holbrooke, assistant secretary of state for European affairs, in Warsaw. He is one of the initiators of broadening NATO and the author of the new structure of security in Europe. Therefore, these questions were at the center of his talks in Warsaw.*

Also, over the past weekend, the heads of U.S. and Russian diplomacy met in Helsinki, where problems were discussed from another perspective. By the way, Holbrooke had assured us in advance at his press conference that the Helsinki talks would not bring the slightest change to U.S. policy on expanding NATO, and that no decision would be made in Helsinki that could be aimed against the interests of Poland.

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What does it mean, in practice? A few days ago, the U.S. daily INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE quoted a Brussels NATO functionary as admitting he was unable to fully comprehend the stance of the United States on the question of broadening the alliance because the United States itself had not been explicit. Is it, then, a long way to NATO, or are we close?

First, what can can be done to shorten the distance:

—First, the alliance requirement to expand NATO is not going to be a charitable action. Expanding NATO could strengthen the competitiveness and enhance the unity of the West for many years to come.

—There is nearly complete unanimity among all the important political groups in Poland about joining NATO. This was stressed by Holbrooke during his visit to Warsaw. The advantage is also made clear in various publications.

—Participation of our military units in the NATO mission in Bosnia (resulting from the Partnership for Peace). Holbrooke suggested that their service in Bosnia would seriously influence the alliance when it is time to examine Poland's access to NATO.

—Lobbying efforts of the Polish national minority in the United States, which demands that the U.S. Government shall present by the end of this year a schedule to expand NATO, including the order and when particular states are going to join the alliance.

—The outstanding results and prospects of the Polish economic transformation, which makes Poland a more reliable and desirable partner.

At the same time, we face numerous obstacles:

—Fears appear among some NATO members that accepting countries that have only recently started democratic and market changes could force the alliance to cover a considerable part of the integration costs and temporarily impede its unity.

—The political unrest in Poland that has led to a change of government is not an unimportant question for NATO. As it was diplomatically stated by Holbrooke in Warsaw, the West will be watching "with attention and sympathy" how Poland facilitates its democratic procedures to solve these complications. (Our friends in NATO add that it is fortunate that there is enough time to clear up all doubts, inasmuch as the applications will be examined no sooner than after this year's December session of the NATO Council).

—Despite many assurances by the West that it will not allow Russia to interfere in the process of expanding the alliance, NATO fears any friction with Moscow like it fears fire, and, at least up until the presidential election in Russia next June, it is not going to do anything that could harm Yeltsin. Will this change after the election?

—Looking more generally at the results of the Russian objections toward expanding NATO, it should be stressed that neither the United States nor the West European countries have so far been able to find a way to reconcile the recognized need to enlarge the alliance with the requirement to pacify Russia, which they perceive as either a potential stabilizing factor or a source of disturbance.

Therefore, the distance to NATO is difficult to measure. This is an incentive for us to continue presenting our arguments; delay would be a waste of the best opportunities for both us and the West. Most important seems to be the belief of the alliance that, if Poland proves able to pass every element of the credibility test, which we assume it will, NATO should quit its indecisiveness as soon as possible.

The problem is that NATO may not be willing to clear up the ambiguity.

Poland: Cimoszewicz: Good Relations With Russia Needed

LD1602134596 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1300 GMT 16 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] After meeting with diplomats accredited to Poland, Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz said that Poland will not change its position on the issue of joining European and euro-atlantic economic, political, and military structures. According to the prime minister, it is obvious that Poland wants to maintain the best possible relations with our eastern neighbors:

[Begin Cimoszewicz recording] We would like them not be afraid of our intentions as regards links to European structures. Our intentions are not bad at all from the point of view of our relations with our neighbors. This is simply how we see the best solution as regards Poland's security and a chance for economic and civilizational development. But Poland and Russia must have very good relations. [end recording]

Poland: Minister Calls U.S. Report 'Accolade' for Army

WS1502134896 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 15 Feb 96 p 3

[Report by "BR, LUZ": "U.S. Report; An Accolade for the Army According to the MON Head"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "This is an accolade for the Polish Armed Forces," Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski told deputies who asked about the report by

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U.S. experts that ZYCIE WARSZAWY wrote about. "Although it does mention a number of our shortcomings, generally speaking it is an accolade," said the defense minister. [passage omitted]

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Romania: Iliescu on Democratic Changes, Minorities, EU

BR1602073796 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 9 Feb 96 pp 20-21

[Interview with Romanian President Ion Iliescu by Antunes Ferreira in Bucharest; date not given: "Romania's Western Option"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *It has been a long time since the "Conductor" sent Ion Iliescu to Iasi, on the border with the then USSR, to keep him far from the center of power. In this interview, he replies, defends himself, and counterattacks. He is a survivor, and he says that democracy is fully established in Romania, although he acknowledges that there are shortages and unemployment, that living standard remains low, that there are "converted" Communists in power but also in the opposition, and that he himself was a member of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP). He could not fail to mention these things, but he stressed vigorously that there is complete freedom in his country and that "in no event" will any freedoms be restricted to achieve a change in mentality. This is because Romania's "firm option" is the Western model.*

[Ferreira] After these years in charge of Romania's destiny can you take stock of the changes in your country?

[Iliescu] The whole face of Romanian society has changed radically over the past six years, as any foreign observer can see, to the end of achieving the Romanian revolution's aims expressed in the 10 points of the proclamation of the night of 22 December 1989.

In the political sphere, a complete democratization has been effected in accordance with European values: a multiparty system, the guaranteeing of basic freedoms, separation of the state bodies, and other principles which are contained in the new Constitution, in force since the 8 December 1991 referendum, and in various laws now approved.

In the sphere of institutions, all those underpinning democracy—parliament, the presidency, the parties, the government, the courts, the local authorities, and the trade unions—have more or less been set up.

In the economic sphere, following a grave crisis, we have succeeded over the past two years in halting the decline and in beginning the revival of production through measures which encourage private enterprise: The private sector—which currently represents around 30 percent in industry and 80 percent to 90 percent in agriculture—will be strongly boosted by the Law on the Acceleration of Privatization Measures.

In the social sphere, the many strategic economic changes have resulted in the creation of a large number of private economic agents, nonexistent in the past. In this sphere unemployment has emerged as an unprecedented factor. We have tried by legislative means to influence the inevitable process of stratification caused by the laws of the market, so as to ensure that this would happen in as just a manner as possible, protecting the needs of the most disadvantaged sections of the population.

But the most spectacular development is the change of mentality, from the immobility to which it was condemned by a rigid system to the dynamism which nowadays manifests itself in all respects and to the confrontation of ideas, which is one of the most promising signs for our society.

[Ferreira] It is said that many senior officials of the former regime are in power "in disguise," and that this leads to the loss of government credibility.

[Iliescu] That is a "label" frequently used in the domestic political struggle for want of arguments and "exported" to political circles outside the country. I can say that there are also former senior Communist officials "in disguise" in the opposition's ranks. In a country such as Romania—in which the Communist Party had 3.8 million members and its youth organization as many again, which means most of the working population—the "former Communists" are everywhere.

I myself was a Communist Party member, but since I did nothing in that capacity of which I feel ashamed I do not try to "disguise" myself. The fact is that my five opponents in the 1992 election were former Communists, the chief of whom was even a former Communist Party secretary and had a vehemently anticommunist platform!

[Ferreira] So can it be said that Romania is now a democratic state? Or a country in transition on the way to democracy? Or an undefined country?

[Iliescu] Can you give me an instance of a society which is not in transition? Of an immobile, ossified society? Romania, like the other former Socialist countries, is a country in a more rapid stage of transition than the Western European countries have experienced. Let us not forget that Romania experienced almost 100 years of parliamentary democracy before the establishment of totalitarianism in 1938. Thus, the return to democracy after 1989 was easier and more natural than for the societies which had not had that experience.

[Ferreira] Since you answer me in that way, let me remind you that I have already met with you on various occasions; the first in Iasi in 1976, then in Bucharest

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in 1977, and next in the 1990 elections. You granted me an interview for this newspaper in Lisbon in 1991. So you see that I have known Romania for 20 years. I believe that a great deal has been attempted here, but there is still a great distance between intentions and reality! What do you have to say to me about that?

[Iliescu] The distance in time between intentions and reality stems, as I have said, from the great inertia of the socioeconomic system and of mentalities. We would also like the alignment at the European economic level to take place more rapidly; it is a pity that this is not objectively possible. As far as Romania's future is concerned, our firm and indisputable choice is that of the model of West Europe; I personally still believe that it is the correct choice.

[Ferreira] The population's living standards are still very low. Prices are very high and wages very low. Are you not afraid of a popular reaction?

[Iliescu] I agree with you. Living standards are still low, and it is not due to chance, particularly because after 1989 there was a constant decline in economic activity, as a result of the destruction of the former centralized structures and the collapse of traditional economic partners, but over the past few years this decline has been contained, and we even note that it has been reversed. And the population was the first to realize, following the disturbances of 1990 and 1991, that violent, uncontrolled reactions cannot improve living standards, but can worsen them.

[Ferreira] So do you mean that the Romanians have lost their fear of speaking? So is there freedom of expression? Of the press? Or, as I have been told, are there not on the contrary "hidden" government guidelines concerning the news media?

[Iliescu] I agree with you again on what you say about complete, unlimited freedom to express opinions. As far as influences on the news media are concerned, these are stronger on the part of the opposition than on the part of the government. As a close observer of Romanian politics, you will surely know that 80 to 90 percent of the media are hostile to the current government. This is normal in periods of crisis, when it is simpler and easier to criticize than to accept responsibilities.

[Ferreira] But are there still political prisoners or prisoners of conscience or opinion in Romania? I am referring to the cases of Hungarian Romanians who deem themselves to be persecuted and to gypsies who make the same complaint. Is this so?

[Iliescu] There are no people in Romania who are detained or persecuted because of their ideas or opinions or because of their ethnic group. The cases of Romanian citizens of Hungarian descent to which you refer—and about whom there has been considerable agitation—concern individuals who committed very clear crimes of homicide or attempted homicide.

As far as the alleged persecution of the gypsies is concerned, this is not a problem of ethnic group, nor is it an exclusively Romanian problem. This is a social problem which exists throughout Europe. It stems from the parasitic way of life adopted by some categories of gypsies which manifests itself in illegal and antisocial actions such as theft, speculation, prostitution, procuring, and so forth. It is essentially a way of life based on consuming without producing. With the reduction of the state's authority following the revolution, that way of life became exacerbated.

[Ferreira] Since we are talking about matters affecting minorities and, in particular, the Hungarian minority, what is the state of present-day Romania's foreign relations? For instance, with the Balkan countries? The serious issues with Hungary seem not to have been resolved or, at least, a satisfactory solution has not been reached. Will these problems with the Hungarians not be detrimental to Romania?

[Iliescu] Relations with the Balkan countries are very good; Romania's role in the area's balance and security is acknowledged by everybody. Not only with respect to the best known conflict—that in the area of the former Yugoslavia—but also with respect to other tense situations in the region, Romania has constantly adopted a constructive stance of encouraging the resolution of problems through dialogue.

With respect to relations with Hungary, I am pleased to be able to say that they are good overall, despite the fact that the conclusion of the Basic Treaty has been postponed, owing to disagreements about the problems of the minorities, with respect to international customs and practices. I believe that our efforts to constantly improve relations with that country, manifested in my recent proposal for achieving through specific steps a historic reconciliation between Romania and Hungary in line with the Franco-German model, will be crowned with success. It is just a pity that extremist forces in Hungary, as well as others in Romania's Hungarian minority and also some of our fellow-countrymen do not view favorably this trend toward the normalization of relations between the two countries; hatred and the incitement of it are the only fertile ground for their demagogic rhetoric.

[Ferreira] Romania wishes to join NATO and the EU. When? How? What has been done to this end?

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[Iliescu] Romania is a member of the Council of Europe and an associate member of the EU, was the first to sign the Partnership for Peace [PFP] with NATO, and has excellent relations with the Western European Union and other Western international bodies.

Going directly to your questions: When? As rapidly as possible. How? As a partner with equal rights and duties. What has been done? Everything that depended on the political will clearly expressed and supported by the whole Romanian political world. But political will in itself cannot overcome the necessary stages of a complex process, just as it cannot overcome our inertia or, we admit, our Western partners' preconceptions, but it can start a process which will overcome this inertia within a period which I hope will be as brief as possible.

[Ferreira]] It is said that there are many, even too many, parties in Romania, but that one, or almost only one, is in charge. Is it the former party in disguise, as I have already asked, or is it a matter of the poor reputation of the parties—and of the politicians?

[Iliescu] The difference between "one" and "almost only one" is important. In Britain and the United States, two parties—hence "almost only one"—are dominant. Are these countries totalitarian? As for whether there are too many parties in Romania, that is true, just as it is also true that none of them has a majority in Parliament. The largest party holds 34 percent of the seats in the two houses of Parliament.

The number of parties will be reduced thorough natural "electoral selection" and will probably reach a stable situation of five or six parties, very clearly defined politically and ideologically. Members of the former Communist Party are in all the important parties; only the opportunists or those who need to hide something in their past disguise themselves.

[Ferreira] Ways of thinking take time to change, and the generation in power still dates from the time of Ceausescu. So did the 1989 revolution fail?

[Iliescu] Ways of thinking have changed a great deal, but the interest groups have not changed at the same time, accusing each other of "antiquated ways of thinking," which creates a false impression of stagnation. Your assertion that the generation in power dates from the time of Ceausescu is also valid for the opposition, which has individuals of the same generation in its ranks.

But power is exercised in terms of parties and not of generations; it is true that in all those parties young people's access to the decisionmaking level is difficult. Moreover, "the generation of the time of Ceausescu" does not mean "Ceausescuist generation." On the contrary, the dictator fell precisely because of the revolt of his contemporaries. And the 1989 revolution was in no way a failed revolution; it is those who lost the opportunity to prevail at that time who present it in that way; that is, as a failed revolution. Those people set their personal ambitions and whims above the public interest and the will of history!

[Ferreira] Can it be concluded from this that some freedoms must still be restricted to make progress in changing ways of thinking?

[Iliescu] Under no circumstances!

[Ferreira] And last: Will you run again for the presidency of the Republic?

[Iliescu] I will make a decision at the right time. [Iliescu ends]

Portugal Is Example To Follow

On relations with Portugal, Iliescu stressed that Romania attaches great importance to developing bilateral relations with the EU countries: "Thus, the development of relations with Portugal over the past few years falls within a natural framework. Portugal traveled, not long ago, a path similar to that which we are now traveling: that of removing dictatorship and its consequences; that of strengthening internal democracy; that of building institutions; that of other countries' acknowledgment of the new society's democratic nature; that of adjusting to European sociopolitical and economic requirements; and, last, that of entering the European structures. In that context we observe with interest your country's experience over the past few decades.

"There are also other meeting points between our countries. First, there is our common Latin origin as a factor of cohesion, even bearing in mind that one of the countries represents the eastern end and the other the western end of Europe's Romance countries.

"Then there is the century-old struggle for political emancipation, for preserving their identities and stability, which has contributed to the similarities in ways of thinking.

"Thus there are real possibilities for the constant development of Romanian-Portuguese relations. These possibilities have hitherto manifested themselves more at the political and cultural levels. We want not only development at those levels but also its increase at the economic, technological, and commercial levels, in parallel with Romania's gradual involvement in the dynamics of European economic exchanges.

"As far as an official visit to Portugal is concerned, I would have great pleasure in paying it. It is a pity that

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my schedule is quite full, so that it is difficult to make any forecast."

Romania: Moldova's Lucinschi Explains Reason for Visit

AU1602113396 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2030 GMT 14 Feb 96

["Exclusive" interview with Petru Lucinschi, president of the Moldovan Parliament, by reporter Dan Preda, after his meeting with Oliviu Gherman, speaker of the Romanian Senate; date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Preda] Mr. President, we are very happy to see the president of Chisinau's parliament here in Romania's capital so soon after an important parliamentary delegation from Chisinau visited Bucharest. What is the purpose of this visit to Bucharest, Mr. President?

[Lucinschi] I believe it is only natural that being in transit from Athens, where we had a working meeting, we should stop for one day in Bucharest for an exchange of views with my counterparts, with the Romanian officials. That is part of the overall aspect of our relations. I say natural because we have similar problems, we have common problems. In this way, the exchange of views enhances our relations by creating new tasks, raising new issues, and bringing about new discussions. During discussions we agree on specific issues and on how we are going to move forward.

[Preda] Could these visits—as a member of the Chisianu parliamentary delegation has said—somehow be suspected of being linked with the election campaign?

[Lucinschi] I am sorry to say, but the political parties and forces are entering this campaign earlier than the voters. Therefore, there are all kinds of quite often useless discussions surrounding this issue. How can this visit be part of the election campaign if it is a natural thing, if it has an objective reason. We do not have a direct flight to Athens and so we are happy to have an opportunity to come here. Should one make such a fuss about each case as if it were an exceptional event? As I have mentioned today, I am happy to have these meetings and they are absolutely normal and should not give rise to any suspicion. It is a normal thing among friends, neighbors, and brothers to meet and discuss issues of common interest.

[Preda] That is true. Therefore, I would like to suggest returning to the subject of the meeting you had at Senate headquarters. How do you assess the reaction of the officials in Bucharest. I would also like to ask you to discuss another issue that you raised during the talks with Professor Oliviu Gherman. Have I understood it correctly or has your party indeed spoken out for the use of the Romanian language?

[Lucinschi] Regarding the discussion during the last session of the parliament of the Republic of Moldova, it goes back a long way. You know that in Moldova we mainly use the expression: the Romanian language. That is, it is the mother tongue, because we are talking about the same Romanian language. Lately, that is, in the past few years, the expression the Romanian language has been used more and more frequently, especially in educational institutions at various levels and in society in general. I must mention again that we are not talking about substituting these two terms [the Moldovan language and the Romanian language], but we are talking about one and the same language, as I noted in parliament. I mentioned that the power spread in parliament between the factions is such that the two factions, that together gained 65 percent in the elections, included in their election platform the specification that they are in favor of the respective expression [the Moldovan language]. The result was predictable. However, the atmosphere during debates was somehow less tense than a few years ago. Things were discussed in a calmer way. I am a member of the PDAM [Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova] faction but I am outside the party and I spoke in my capacity as both deputy and parliament president.

I believe that in this case, the free use of the language on a voluntary basis, with each person using the language as he believes appropriate, is the situation that currently prevails in Moldova and we should not make matters more tense that they really are.

[Preda] Mr. President, a last question: political circles and Chisinau commentators speak about you as the main candidate in the presidential elections in Chisinau. If that is indeed the case, what are the prospects for our countries?

[Lucinschi] It is too early to talk about presidential elections, that is, to name the candidates for these elections. The elections will indeed take place in December, but there is a long way to go until then. I am not new in politics. Thus, it is clear to me that I cannot take such a long-term decision, for so many months ahead, for seven or eight months, I do not even know how many. Thus, given our relations with Romania and the frequency of our meetings, I believe that this issue will come up again in our discussions.

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Romania: PD Leader Calls For Opposition To Unite

AU1502133896 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 6 Feb 96 p 5

[Unattributed report on statements by Democratic Party Leader Petre Roman: "Petre Roman Is Delivering a Unitary Message of the Opposition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a statement made to a ROMPRES correspondent, Petre Roman, the Social Democratic Union's candidate for the next presidential elections, referred to his message in the election campaign regarding euro-atlantic integration:

"There is one thing I must mention that I have also said at the various meetings I have held throughout the country—I have visited five counties this year—and that is that we have lost momentum somewhat these three and a half years in the economic reform that would have brought us closer to European Union standards.

"In the year 2000 or in 1999, Romania will negotiate integration in the European Union. This cannot be achieved if the economic situation in our country and the reform of the state institutions fails to make us compatible with European Union standards. The three and a half years have been rather a case of sticking in the mud, and in certain fields even returning to the past. The next four years are therefore decisive. The four years mean: do we catch the train of European integration or miss it.

"For the ordinary people in our country integration in the European Union means simply that we enter the group of developed countries, where prosperity is accessible to more of the population, to a larger number of people. Therefore, the stakes are very high. Obviously, we can no longer believe, and I see that very few people still believe, that those who brought us to this situation in the past three and a half years (that is, the political option that was taken in 1992) will also be the people who can pull us out of the impasse. They were not even able to see what the problems are and which are the great shortfalls of our country, let alone to solve those problems. The solutions that we need must also be very rapid. That is why I say: this year is decisive for catching the train of European integration."

Regarding the prospect of presenting a unitary message of the opposition in the electoral campaign and supporting the candidates who run on the same side of the political spectrum, Petre Roman said:

"For three and a half years the Democratic Party has constantly showed that a more united message of the opposition is needed. One and a half year ago, during a meeting I had at the office of ROMANIA LIBERA with all the leaders of the opposition, I repeated the idea that the opposition can and must win the elections if it is capable of projecting an alternative image. This essentially means a more united message. We have been in a tough opposition, because we, the PD representatives, have often been hit and such pressure has been put on us as is inadmissible in a democracy. Nevertheless, the PD has firmly stayed in the opposition.

"A little while ago, in September, we proposed that together with the parties included in the CDR, together with those that have left the convention, we should create a big alliance to ensure that the elections are correct. Nothing could be worse for Romanian democracy and for the improvement of our moral life than fraud in the elections. Unfortunately, electoral fraud is still possible.

"We held a general meeting with all the leaders of opposition parties where we agreed to establish this alliance, which was called the Technical Protocol, to watch over the correctness of the elections. We are happy to see that this is moving towards favorable solutions.

"This protocol includes the provision that the best placed candidate of the opposition should be supported by the entire opposition in the second round. This is very important. It is extremely necessary. If that person were me, there is no doubt that I would embark on this final leg of the race in the name of the opposition, because we are all unhappy with the current situation and want to make it right. There is no way that we can believe that those who have led us into the current situation will be able to find the solutions. It is clear that things can no longer go on as they are and that the opposition must succeed in forming an alternative and in offering a solution to get us out of the impasse, poverty, and stagnation we find ourselves in."

Romania: PNTCD Rejects Alliance With PDSR

AU1502091796 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 6 Feb 96 p 3

[Interview with Remus Opris, PNTCD deputy chairman and coordinator of its Image, Information, and Mass Media Department, by Roxana Iordache; place and date not given: "We Will Ally Ourselves Only to the Forces We Can Implement in Our Governing Program 'Contract With Romania'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Iordache] Mr. Deputy Chairman, in view of the primary role played by image and media manipulation in the political game, how can you explain the fact that the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] is assiduously courting the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD] of all parties, which is its strongest adversary and which it has

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systematically accused until now all possible evils, under the slogan "It's Coposu's [deceased former PNTCD president] fault?"

[Opris] Until recently, the rulers were identifying the PNTCD with the authority of President Coposu, whom they kept slandering to falsify and compromise the image of the entire Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR]. The moment he was admitted in the hospital, they made a turnabout and began presenting him as an untouchable and legendary figure—which, indeed, he was, but it is not up to them, who have piled unspeakable slander upon him, to say so now—a man who has built and is responsible for everything. Thus, the Iliescu regime tried to suggest to and even convince the public at large that, without Corneliu Coposu, there is no opposition or PNTCD left and that without Corneliu Coposu, the PNTCD is a mere vacancy, where the upstarts are fighting to take over the party! The rulers did their best to project a false image to the party on the eve of its congress, by claiming that the "PNTCD is torn apart by internal strife, particularly by a conflict between generations; it lacks valuable leaders; it is at loggerheads with its political allies; and it is undermined by arrangements struck behind the scenes between various 'groups' and the representatives of those in power." Through this image, they aimed at destroying the popularity of Corneliu Coposu's legendary image, which was transferred to the PNTCD, since the Iliescu regime was obviously worried about the extraordinary moral and political capital left to us by our former president, which represented our party's asset before the congress. Therefore, since those in power know that it will sully everything it touches, it strove to accredit the idea that it has infiltrated the PNTCD. This message had to be circulated directly or indirectly. The blow should have been administered to our electorate. The rulers planed to produce a schism, so that the PNTCD members should doubt their own leaders and destabilize everything.

[Iordache] What image did the Iliescu regime project to destabilize the PNTCD?

[Opris] Basically, two questions were launched: "Will the PNTCD break up?" and "Will the PNTCD people accept governing together with the PDSR?" To this end, they also insinuated that there are certain differences over doctrine and political orientation within the party, that is a "center-right" grouping (which, "disappointed" after the congress, was supposed to rally around a "party" called "Romania's Alternative," to replace the true alternative) and a "center-left" grouping (which was going to make the respective "compromise with the PDSR"). Moreover, the PDSR, through its leaders Gherman [PDSR chairman], Solcanu [PDSR deputy chairman], and Paslaru [PDSR spokesman] were making various hints at establishing certain "contacts" with "certain" groups that should not be "deconspired" before the congress, in order not to jeopardize their ascent to the top in the party and then "openly strike a deal" with those in power! However, the congress strongly proved the opposite, namely, the PNTCD's unity, thus throwing a scare into those who hoped to be able to destroy us.

[Iordache] The PNTCD congress gave the green light for changing the balance of power in the country, with the opposition going on the offensive, and the current rulers on the defensive. What are you going to do to preserve and capitalize on the current political and electoral advantage?

[Opris] We will maintain our present course. We are now at a stage of full political maturity. We have consolidated our true image of the strongest and most balanced opposition party. It is our presence which gives cohesion to the CDR. The congress gave us the mandate to win the elections. We are going to submit to the country a well-defined electoral program, ideology, and doctrine and appropriate leaders with character. Therefore, we are prepared not only for the electoral struggle, but also for governing. This is how we are being perceived by the PDSR, too, whose political performance is considered inadequate by more than 70 percent of the population. Currently undergoing a popularity crisis, as far as the government's activity is concerned, the PDSR is trying to change its image of incompetence and lack of identity, program, and solutions, through repeated cabinet reshuffles, which in themselves are nonconstitutional. The PDSR is trying to clean up its image, by ridding itself of allies, who have become a liability for the country's image abroad or for other arrangements at home.

Likewise, the PDSR betrays and abandons its allies—see the situation of the Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania [PDAR], the Greater Romania Party [PRM], and now the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR]—with other allies from the same "monstrous coalition" between Ceausescu's assassins and his faithful supporters yet to follow. After all, the only thing that bound them together was the interest in clinging to power and ensuring that the reform process stagnates. In its desperate attempt to halt the collapse of its political image, the PDSR is trying to push forward certain cultural, medical, and sports personalities, thus hoping to rectify a spoiled political product through the promotion of these personalities. Primarily, however, the PDSR continues to accredit the idea that it enjoys credibility with the PNTCD and that it could negotiate a common government with us. Thus, they try to mend the party's image through hypothetical openings toward the PNTCD,

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which, in the PDSR's opinion, might diminish our electoral impact as a strong and indivisible alternative. That is why, the Cotroceni [presidential palace] and the government are obsessively disseminating this rumor, which generates no less obsessive questions from the press—the legitimate spokesman of the public at large, but also the unwilling promoter of governmental "suggestions" at times.

[Iordache] Are you referring to the two questions that have repeatedly been put to you, namely, will you negotiate with the PDSR? Will the PNTCD form a government with them if the need arises to put together a parliamentary majority after the elections?

[Opris] I believe we should continue to maintain our present position, since this is what our electorate expects from us. If this electorate is not yet sufficiently on our side, then we will not win over the undecided voters with ambiguities and duplicities. We need a clear and firm message. Our obligation toward the electorate is to observe our political program, proceeding from the "Contract with Romania."

[Iordache] Who will you make electoral and governmental alliances with?

[Opris] One can rule out the extremists and the compromised parties. I include the PDSR among the compromised parties because of its governing performance. Likewise, those who do not support our program are excluding themselves from such cooperation. Nevertheless, we must pay attention to the electoral offer of the non-CDR opposition. We must see to it that we do not implement a postelectoral alliance policy that would push the Social Democratic Union (USD), that is, the alliance between the Democratic Party [PD] and the Romanian Social Democratic Party [PSDR], into the PDSR's arms. Likewise, I believe that one should also regroup the opposition forces that could end up under the electoral threshold [5 percent] of the future law, but this should be done by observing the CDR program and protocol. Whoever wants to be our ally, must clearly realize that it must help us come to power and govern with our program, the CDR program.

Romania: SIE Director Will Have Ministerial Rank

AU1502080596 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 7 Feb 96 p 12

[Article by Catalin Varzaru: "The Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service Will Be Led by an Omnipotent Director, the Man of the Republic's President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The senators voted yesterday—with 87 votes for, seven against, and six abstentions—on the Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Foreign Intelligence Service [SIE]. The 19 articles of the law have easily passed through the Senate, with the only objections coming from Karoly Szabo [senator of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, UDMR] in the Defense Commission.

According to the law, SIE belongs to Romania's national defense system. Its activity is coordinated and organized by the Country's Supreme Defense Council [CSAT], with SIE being obliged to report to it on its activity whenever required.

Through an amendment introduced by Radu Timofte, president of the Senate's Defense Commission, Parliament will be able to exert control over SIE through a special commission consisting of five members of Parliament's defense commissions. This control will be exerted in keeping with a set of rules adopted by the two chambers.

SIE will be run by a director with the rank of minister, appointed by CSAT, at the proposal of Romania's president. He will have full powers in running this intelligence service. The SIE activity is covert and a state secret; consequently, the relevant documents are kept in the SIE's own archives and can only be accessed with the director's approval.

Article 9 stipulates that the means used to obtain, check, and utilize the various data and information gathered should not infringe upon the basic rights or freedoms of the citizens or upon their private life, honor, and reputation, and should not subject them to any illegal restrictions.

The legal rights stipulated for the personnel of the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI] also apply to the SIE cadres and their heirs. The SIE members involved in the exercise of the state's authority are public servants and have the same obligations as them.

Karoly Szabo suggested that former SIE employees no longer under cover should be placed in other jobs by the government. His amendment was rejected. The SIE will be in charge of finding new placements for its former employees.

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Federal

FRY: Milosevic, Spanish FM Discuss Ties, Bosnia

LD1502173496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1559 GMT 15 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 15 Feb (TANJUG) — Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received Carlos Westendorp, Spanish minister of foreign affairs, who is on an official visit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, President Milosevic's office has announced.

In cordial talks, which occurred in an atmosphere of frankness and mutual understanding, the greatest attention was devoted to the question of the further development of bilateral relations between the FRY and Spain.

Great mutual interest in strengthening mutual contacts and links, in the framework of which the continued high-level political dialogue is especially important, was stressed with pleasure. In this light the visit of the Spanish foreign minister to our country opens up real prospects for the renewal and initiation of meaningful cooperation in economic, cultural, scientific-technical, sports, and other fields, where in the past mutually beneficial results were registered.

Stress was laid on the importance of strengthening peace and stability, and in this the united efforts of the FRY and international players in consolidating political circumstances and developments in the Balkans are, without doubt, the top priority.

The consistent implementation of the peace agreement for Bosnia, it was said in the talks, should ensure the overall normalization of relations in the region and extinguish one of the most dangerous centers of crisis and confrontation in Europe.

In the realization of this goal, it is particularly important to speed up the process of the economic reconstruction of the region in which the civil war took place. Spain, as a member of the EU which has already shown a constructive attitude in this regard, is expected to offer full support and continue to contribute actively to the realization of recovery projects both in the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation.

Both sides expressed the belief that the equal participation of the FRY in the UN and other international organizations would soon be renewed, including the full normalization and promotion of its diplomatic relations to the highest level.

Taking part in the talks were Milan Milutinovic, federal minister for foreign affairs, and Jose Antonio Bordallo, Spanish charge d'affaires in Belgrade.

FRY: Montenegrin FM on Talks With Spanish Counterpart

LD1502201096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1630 GMT 15 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 15 (TANJUG) — Montenegrin Foreign Minister Janko Jeknic said Thursday that visiting Spanish Foreign Minister Carlos Westendorp had stated his country's readiness to speedily normalize relations with Yugoslavia and help its reintegration into the international community.

Jeknic, who made the statement to TANJUG and the paper POBJEDA after talks with Westendorp in Belgrade on Thursday, said that the Spanish minister had expressed Madrid's willingness to promote cooperation with Montenegro in the field of culture, education, science, sports and particularly the human environment.

Jeknic said that it was in the interest of Montenegro to renew cooperation with Spain and other Mediterranean countries and the European Union because the Yugoslav Republic had close geographic, historical and cultural ties with these states.

During their talks, the Montenegrin minister highly praised Spain's contribution to the search for a peaceful solution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, Jeknic's office said in a statement.

Westendorp is the first EU foreign minister to visit Montenegro since the signing of the peace accords in Dayton and Paris. His visit shows that Spain favours a speedy normalization of relations with Yugoslavia and a renewal and intensification of eu-Yugoslav cooperation, the statement said.

Westendorp pointed to the consistent and constructive role played by Montenegro in restoring peace in the former Yugoslavia and extended full support to this orientation.

Westendorp invited Jeknic and a Montenegrin business delegation to visit Spain for talks on concrete forms of cooperation.

FRY: Spanish Trade Minister Holds Talks on Cooperation

LD1502230196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2137 GMT 15 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 15 (TANJUG) — Yugoslav Minister of Trade Djordje Siradovic conferred in Belgrade Thursday with visiting Spanish Min-

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ister of Trade Apolonio Ruiz Ligero on a renewal of economic cooperation between the two countries.

During the talks, Siradovic conveyed to Ruiz Ligero the expectations of the Yugoslav Government that Spain would work to restore Yugoslavia's equal status in relations with the European Union, the Yugoslav Information Ministry said in a statement.

Ruiz Ligero agreed that a E.U. discriminatory stand towards Yugoslavia was unfounded and pledged to advocate that the European Union, pending a EU-Yugoslav agreement, applies facilities for Yugoslav goods, similarly to other states which have emerged from the former Yugoslavia.

Siradovic and Ruiz Ligero discussed prospects for cooperation between Yugoslav and Spanish firms on their and third markets, the statement said.

Ruiz Ligero is visiting Yugoslavia as a member of a Spanish state and business delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Carlos Westendorp.

Yugoslav Trade Minister Djordje Siradovic told TANJUG after the meeting with Spanish Trade Secretary Apolonio Ruiz Ligera that Spain's support to Belgrade's efforts to renew the cooperation agreement with the European Union was highly appreciated.

Speaking of the difficulties experienced by Yugoslav companies aiming to export to the E.U. market, Siradovic quoted Ruiz Ligero as saying that the Spanish Government was prepared to urge the implementation of customs and foreign trade measures in the European Union that would facilitate the export of Yugoslav goods.

It was agreed that the renewal of comprehensive trade, banking and insurance ties would be in the interest of both sides, said Siradovic.

It was also agreed during the talks that good conditions existed for promoting cooperation in the metal-working and food-processing industries, agriculture, the iron and steel, shipbuilding, timber and chemical industries, he added.

In view of Spain's growing investments abroad, the Yugoslav side said it was interested in taking part in projects in both countries and in joint appearances on third markets, said Siradovic.

The two sides also agreed that bilateral trade could well exceed the previous figure of 60 million dollars a year, he added.

FRY: Article Examines Army Role, Leadership, Future

AU1602110596 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 96 p 13

[Article by Vladimir Jovanovic: "The Daytime Nightmares of General Perisic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Momcilo Perisic [Army chief of staff] has for a long time not been as sulky as he was at the latest session of the Supreme Defense Council. One reliable source says that earlier on one occasion, General Perisic said with pride that he carried a hand grenade in his bag to throw on Vlado Trifunovic [a general who was pardoned after being charged with treason], in case he came across him. Trifunovic is now free. Perisic was in the team of the "merciful." However, nobody believes that the commander of the General Staff has really changed his mind. As a matter of fact, his position has now been even further degraded. Perisic has once again been humiliated by Slobodan Milosevic, according to the view of his officers. And it was Perisic who in his time rose out of the ashes of the brutal shelling of Mostar, just when Trifunovic became a metaphor for traitor. It was around these two extremes, around these two officers of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA], on their examples of the "heroic" and the "cowardly," that the "new patriotism" of the so-called Army of Yugoslavia was built, in which Perisic took an honorary place. The happy end of Trifunovic's case broke the myth of the "continuity of Serbian arms." Perisic participated in the decision "for" Trifunovic's freedom. Did he have any choice? The worn out and degenerated mechanism of the Army of Yugoslavia does not raise anybody's confidence in this moment. Milosevic lost the confidence long before all others realized that, including the generals. The flirtation of the Yugoslav military leadership with that of Pale, i.e. from Han Pijesak, did not manage to create anything but the situation in which General Ratko Mladic now helplessly and idly spends his days playing chess in his bunker, absent-minded (Milosevic told Richard Holbrooke: "He is clinically mad!"), while Gen. Perisic looks helplessly, at the question of his subordinates: "Are we really going to join NATO?" There is no official military attitude on this issue, except for the words of Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic, before Dayton talks, and the words of one significant officer, after Dayton. Minister Bulatovic, the man for all regimes and a regular customer of the "Legat" bar and of the Yugoslav Army club, last June denied the possibility of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" becoming a member of NATO. Nobody takes that statement seriously any longer, just like any other opinion of Minister Bulatovic. However, on the anniversary of the Air Force, last 24 December, the

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commander of this branch, General Ljubisa Velickovic was open — unusual for a Yugoslav officer. The words of Gen. Velickovic were reported by the daily press and in other media only in excerpts, and, according to the BETA reporter from Belgrade, he said among other things: "The attitude toward NATO is a political issue, but we should look for a solution in Europe, in our neighborhood, and in the international community."

This absolutely new attitude coming from the Army structure instantly incited the journalists to associate him with possible changes in the Army leadership. Gen. Velickovic refuted such a possibility: "The commander of the General Staff is not chosen by any order. If you count with me, that is not a realistic variant, and that would not be good. In the Army of Yugoslavia, because of the normal relationship between the arms and the branches in it, it is normal for the commander of the General Staff to be from the ground forces, which in a war bring the final solution on this terrain!"

In this way, two conclusions could indirectly be reached: Gen. Velickovic, as the most serious candidate for commander, still has sentimental feelings toward Gen. Perisic, who at the beginning of his mandate got him out of the anonymity of a clerk in the Federal Administration for Flight Control; the second, more important, conclusion refers to the fact that the state leadership counts on Gen. Perisic in the next short period, which is a result of present circumstances and not a wish or a part of a thought-out plan. If Milosevic should bring the Serbs to order, in accordance with the interests of the international community, then Perisic should adjust the Army of Yugoslavia with those interests and with additional views of Milosevic on the place and the role of the Army in society!

In that way the Army leadership, contrary to their feelings about the interpretation of justice and the role of Serbs on the geopolitical map of Europe, were forced to negotiate in Vienna on the reduction of its military potential, cooperation with the Western military alliance, and acceptance of foreign control over its materiel, etc. There is also a problem of a mental nature: Officers educated in the spirit of learned socialism, accepting the self-delusion called "the change," i.e. Serb nationalism, have hardly ever come out of the matrix of what the moderate Jevrem Brkovic describes as the "ideological brandy of communism." The roots of the panicky hysteria and the fear of NATO have a long tradition, so the process of adjustment will be painful and full of uncertainty.

However, the tragic culmination is not only in the ideological education, but also in what came out of it: The cowardly barbarism and the massacre of civilians committed by a part of the present officers of the so-called Yugoslav Army in the course of the war in Croatia and Bosnia, and also their blind trust and the sad disappointment in Milosevic, as well as the inevitable hypocrisy, which is reflected not only in the fact that up to now they said their oath twice, on the altars of two different states, believing in the "continuity." In fact, the officers of the so-called Yugoslav Army, a predominating number of them, must believe in something — in Tito, in AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia], in Blagoje Adzic, in Serbianhood, in the genetic inferiority of the "Viennese stableboys," in Ceko Dacevic, in Mladic, in Martic, in the just struggle of the Serb people, in the anti-Serbian plot of Ante Markovic [the last prime minister of former Yugoslavia].... and of course, in the first place, in Milosevic. That "belief" has now put them in the nightmare of having to face the adulterous wish of Milosevic and of the Serbian political public to cooperate with the Western military alliance. The famous military aspects of the Dayton agreements are unambiguous here, and the estimations, which some time ago appeared on the pages of this magazine as well, are that there will come to limitations and control over the military potential of Serbia. Thus the Dayton agreements order the destruction of a certain amount of materiel of the Army of Yugoslavia (apparently this concerns over 100 military aircraft and over 200 tanks, among others). The military ratio of the forces of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia must be brought to the proportion of 5:2:2, and in Bosnia 2:1, in relation to the entities of the Federation and the Serb-Bosnian republic [sentence as published]. The deadline for the start of the activities on this is 19 June of this year. A part from these, a number of other "measures and actions" will radically restrain the so-called military sovereignty of Serbia, which has been praised until recently — the generals of the Army of Yugoslavia will have to give notification of their bigger troop movements and maneuvers, civilian and certain military objects will be used by NATO for free and without any checks, transit for Bosnia will have the same treatment, the NATO soldiers in the IFOR [Implementation Force] units will not have to prove their identity, nor will they be liable before civil or military authorities of Serbia for any sort of offenses they might commit, but only before their commands, etc. Some time ago, Gen. Perisic decisively discarded the possibility for the airport of Tuzla to be opened for humanitarian deliveries (Milosevic said at the time that that would be a "plac dam" [as published] for an attack on Serbia), and now a big NATO base is being built there, only several minutes' flight away from Belgrade. Still, the central problem of the Army of Yugoslavia is finances, and they question the elementary existence of the Army. Of course, that issue is

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directly related to the degree of autonomy of the General Staff and of its influence on the political centers of power, which is in constant regression. Therefore, the military budget for this year is realistically smaller than last year's, and it only serves for mere survival. There can be no mention of the professionalization of the Army structure, reforms, or the replacement of the already outdated weapons of the third generation with the new ones.

The size of the Army of Yugoslavis is determined at from 100,000 to 120,000 soldiers, and the global structure is such that around 50 percent, i.e. 50,000 to 60,000, should be composed of regular soldiers, and the other half of professional soldiers: Officers, noncommissioned officers, civilians employed by the military, and soldiers under contract. Four years ago, as a standard for the calculation of the annual amount which should be invested in the Army of Yugoslavia "per soldier," one of the planners of the "new Army," General Sreten Cupic, took the average realized by the JNA in the period 1975-1990, which amounted to $13,000. However, since in the planned size of the Army of Yugoslavia the participation of the professional, i.e. the paid part, increased in comparison to that participation in the JNA, it requires the increase of investments per one soldier. According to Gen. Cupic, that difference could be bridged with an additional $1,000, meaning $14,000 altogether. If that parameter were applied, then it turns out that the necessary budget for the Yugoslav Army is $1.4 billion for an army of 100,000 soldiers, or $1.68 billion for an army of 120,000 soldiers — which is 4.39 or 5.27 percent of the GDP of Serbia and Montenegro from the "golden" year of 1990, which can hardly be achieved in the years to come. And the Army needs money for at lest 13 important things: Salaries, supply service and health, training and education, remount and maintenance of technical equipment, maintenance of immobility [odrzavanje nepokretnosti], social programs within the Army, functional expenditures, massive armament and provision of military equipment, transformation of military objects into objects for accommodation, war material reserves, construction and furnishing of officers' apartments, supply of necessary means for general use, and unplanned expenditure.

With regard to the war policy Milosevic conducted until recently, the means set aside for the Army up to now, although minimal, were close to the optimum which the economy of Serbia could endure, if the parallel means set aside for the forces of the Interior Ministry are considered normal. However, now it has become clear that the Army will have to be by no means bigger than 0.75 percent of the total population of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," and, according to some unofficial data your reporter got hold of, this figure could even be smaller. The total number of troops of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs in this moment is around 130,000 people (police plus related services and installations), which exceeds 1 percent of the total population of Serbia. That figure is considered to be the normal number of troops of one national army; this fact, together with the fact that recently a legal regulation was passed on the introduction of military ranks in the police units, and also the character of the weapons which the Serbian police possesses, lead many to the conclusion that on domestic terrain the Interior Ministry of Serbia has practically taken over the Army's role in the "protection of the Constitution," whereas the Army has been reduced to guarding borders and the projection of forces toward Montenegro, as well as being the base of materiel for massive destruction in Kosovo.

Because of this hardly bearable political and economic status, the so-called Yugoslav Army has become a burden, first of all a financial one. Its role becomes more and more discrediting, not only for itself but for the civil authorities as well. In this moment the Army is most probably one of the biggest domestic debtors in Serbia, and it owes so much money to the Montenegrin military industry (the "4 November" plant in Mojkovac and "1 December" plant in Pljevlja) that further production in these plants has been questioned. The "Radoje Dakic" plant in Podgorica has asked to be awarded the so-called Travnik program, i.e. the program of making cannon barrels for howitzers, which is a profitable business, but the military leadership sees its partner for this business (and for export) in the Serbian "Crvena Zastava" plant in Kragujevac. The prime minister [of Montenegro] Milo Djukanovic, who took part in the "Valdanosa" "deal" for the Navy wrecks, even told the directors of Montenegrin companies that they did not have to do business with the Army any longer, if it does not pay....

All this is only a part of the painful reality for the generals of the so-called Yugoslav Army, after the level of military readiness of their units was reduced to a normal state in mid-December. This also defrosted the situation in which the Army, after turbulent scandals concluded with the case of corruption and illegal purchase of honey and toilet paper by General Zivota Panic, and because of the state of "war danger," was spared from criticism and discussions about it in Serbia. Last week the persistent Richard Goldstone, after he was given appropriate U.S. guarantees, warned the authorities of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" that sanctions could once more be imposed if they did not cooperate with the Hague tribunal. In that way the extradition of the members of the JNA/Army of Yugoslavia accused of war crimes will be used together

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with serious political threats. And the Hague list, just like the list of inner-Serbian accusations, has still not been concluded. In this way the question from the beginning of this text — namely if Gen. Perisic had any choice in deciding about the freedom of one honest officer and man — was answered.

Serbia

Serbia: New Director of Studio B Television Elected

LD1502174096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1615 GMT 15 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 15 Feb (TANJUG) — The management committee of Studio B Independent Television, which was elected at today's session of the Belgrade Assembly, held its first meeting immediately after the assembly session, and appointed Dragise Kovacevic, the long-serving Studio B journalist and editor, as acting director and editor in chief. This was made known in a statement from the city assembly today.

The management committee decided that a statute for Studio B will be adopted within one month as well as all the additional legal acts required for normal operations. Information should also be prepared on the material, financial, organizational, and staffing situation and a draft editorial policy drawn up.

The members of the management committee called for the stabilization of staffing and funding of Studio B Independent Television, saying that they believe its reputation will be strengthened on the basis of the original principles which at one time established it.

Since Studio B employees have not been paid for two and a half months, the management committee decided to urgently seek an appropriate solution, the statement says.

Serbia: Opposition Parties Condemn Takeover of Studio B

LD1502214396 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1752 GMT 15 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 15 Feb (TANJUG) — Opposition parties in Serbia today sharply criticized the decision of the Belgrade industrial tribunal to register Independent Television Studio B as a public enterprise, and the decision by the Belgrade Assembly to form a management committee to run the company.

The Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS] said that "the takeover of a television station, the name of which contains the word 'independent,' is sufficient indication of the nature of this deed which will have long-term political consequences."

"The opposition in Serbia must respond in an appropriate manner to the challenge laid down by the regime and to this end the DSS calls on all democratically oriented parties to join forces," the party's statement says.

The Serbian Radical Party [SRS] announced that at its executive committee session today it was agreed that the party "will do everything in its power to help this non-regime television station, whose objective and unbiased reporting was not to the liking of the current rulers, to survive." [passage omitted]

In a statement issued by its presidency, the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO] said that the television station — "a symbol of independent journalism" — was taken over by "political commissars in the JUL [Yugoslav Left] and the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS]" on the basis of a verdict by the Serbian Supreme Court which will "soon, in the new Serbia, come to be studied by students as a shameful episode in the legal profession."

Serbia: Studio B Radio Restored to 'Social Ownership'

LD1502173096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1614 GMT 15 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 15 Feb (TANJUG) — At a session today, the Belgrade Assembly adopted a decree on setting up a management committee for the Studio B network radio organization in order to realize the city's rights as a founder of this broadcasting house.

Ljubomir Milic, secretary of the city assembly, was appointed chairman of the management committee.

The committee members are: city assembly deputies Predrag Petrovic, Zoran Andrijasevic, and Goran Vujacic; Mira Djurovic, member of the city assembly's executive committee; Branka Dikanovic, assistant city secretary of the Information Secretariat; and Studio B members Dragan Kojadinovic, Dimitrije Sladic, and Vesna Vojvodic. [passage omitted]

Studio B has been restored to the status of a company in social ownership [from being a shareholders' company] and the right of the city of Belgrade as a founder of this broadcasting house has been realized, said [Belgrade public prosecutor] Borivoje Drazic. [passage omitted]

Opposition deputies in the city assembly walked out of the session when the issue of Studio B was included in the agenda because they believe this is in breach of the city assembly's code of practice. In their earlier statements, they expressed the opinion that such a decision is wrong, and that it will remove the right to freedom of information.

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Montenegro

Montenegro: Bulatovic Meets With Bulgarian PM

LD1302212696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1928 GMT 13 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, Feb. 13 (TANJUG) — Montenegro President Momir Bulatovic and visiting Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhan Videnov agreed here Tuesday that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina was possible only on the basis of a consistent implementation of the Dayton peace accords.

Bulatovic and Videnov said the same was true if life was to return back to normal in Bosnia-Herzegovina and genuine prospects for development were to be opened, an official statement on the talks said.

Yugoslavia and Bulgaria support the international community's activities aimed at eliminating impediments standing in the way of the implementation of the peace accords and they continue making their full contibution to that end, the statement said.

Lasting peace, political stability and understanding and cooperation in the region are a vital interest of the Balkan states, especially of the transition countries, including Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, according to the statement.

Bulatovic lent full support to Videnov's initiative for the Balkan foreign ministers to meet soon.

Videnov met also with Montenegro Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic.

He set out during the meeting that 'Bulgaria supports and will raise an initiative for Yugoslavia's reintegration into international organizations, financial and trade institutions,' an official statement said.

Videnov said, 'we must not let the Balkans return to the time of bloc confrontation, or even further back into the past.'

The two sides drew attention to the great possibilities which exist for cooperation between Montenegro and Bulgaria in metallurgy, the mechanical engineering, wood processing and textile industries, shipping, tourism, transportation, science, culture, the media, education and sports.

Videnov told the press after the meeting that his talks with Bulatovic and Djukanovic reflected a full concurrence of views on the resolution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and the development of inter-Balkan cooperation.

Djukanovic said he and Videnov had set out that the furthering of inter-Balkan cooperation and relations between the Balkans, on one side, and European integrated organizations, on the other, was one of the most important tasks of all Balkan nations.

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